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In the complex, highly developed U.S. life insurance industry,
regulation emphasizes  prudence and  solvency and  does not
inhibit competition and innovation. But because there are no
satisfactory measures of efficiency and profitability, it is diffi-
cult to assess industry performance.
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The U.S. life insurance industry comprises more  operate in New York must comply with New
than 1,200 active companies with an impressive  York rules.
record of innovation. Annual premiums for life
insurance and annuity products amount to about  Regulation emphasizes prudence and sol-
5 percent of GNP and total assets to 26 percent  vency. There are no minimum requirements for
of GNP.  investing in govemment bonds or "high-priority"
sectors, but tight maximum limits are often
Life insurance companies are major partici-  imposed on different assets, especially holdings
pants in U.S. capital markets. They invest in all  of corporate equities, and on agents' commis-
types of bonds. mortgage loans and mortgage-  sions. In recent years, regulations have empha-
backed securities, and corporate equities. They  sized the "prudent man" rule and have relied on
hold about one-third of all corporate bonds and  solvency monitoring - including the use of
about 15 percent of mortgage-backed securities.  valuation r:-serves for investment assets - to
Conservative policie^ ^.od  regulations kcep their  ensure insurance companies'  safety.
holdings in corporate equities down to only 3
percent of all corporate equities - and to about  Wright underscores the lack of satisfactory
9 percent of their total assets (compared with 38  measures of efficiency and profitability, which is
percent for corporate bonds and 13 percent for  explained by the long-term nature of the con-
govemment bonds).  tracts, differences in the use of mortality tables
and discount rates, and differences in the valua-
In describing the characteristics of products  tion of assets and the treatment of unrealized
that life insurance companies offer, Wright  capital gains. This hampers an objective assess-
highlights how fiscal incentives promote long-  ment of the industry's performance and raises
term financial savings. He notes that although  problems for insurance taxation.
federal tax laws are complex, their guiding
principle is to favor insurance protection and  Wright also reviews some public policy
saving for retirement, while discouraging the  issues that affect life insurance companies,
abuse of tax privileges for shon-term investment.  including nontaxation of the companies'  invest-
ment income, life insurer solvency, state versus
Insuran%e  regulation is fragmented among  federal regulation, guarantee funds and moral
state authorities, but coordinated through the  hazard issues, investment regulation and safety,
National Association of Insurance Commission-  accounting standards for asset valuation, and
ers (NAIC). New York state rules are influential  links between banks and insurance companies.
because companies based elsewhere that want to
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The financial  systems of most developing countries  are dominated  by their banking sectors.  With few
notable exceptions  (Singapore, Maiaysia, Chile and Korea), long-term contractual  savings institutions,
such as pension  funds and life insurance  companies,  play a small part in most countries. There are three
main reasons for this underdevelopment  of contractual  savings: the low level of income;  the existence
of unfunded  social security  systems; and the imposition  of restrictive  regulations  on insurance  companies
(World Bank, 1989  and Vittas and Skully, 1991).
Insurance  operations  have  been subject  to tight restrictions  in most developing  countries. The sector has
often been monopolized  by state-owned  companies, competition  and innovation have been stifled by
controls on  premiums and products, and  accumulated funds have been inv,ested in  low-yielding
government securities.  With highly negative returns on their investments, insurance companies have
effectively  operated  as (inflation)  tax collectors. In recent years, many  developing  countries  have started
to reform their pension and insu'.ance  systems in an attempt  to mobilize long-term  financial resources,
promote capital markets and encourage  private sector development. Reform initiatives  are particularly
strong in Latin American and Eastern European countries where social security systems experience
serious financial  pressures.
As insurance  regulations  are reformed, one question  facing  policy makers  in developing  countries  is what
would  be vhe  structure  of a competitive  industry  and what kind of regulations  would  be required  to ensure
the safety and soundness of insurance assets without i-hibiting competition and innovation.  Unlike
banking where there  is  wide international consensus on the  importance and  types of  prudential
regulations,  in the insurance  industry  there are still considerable  variations  in regulatory  philosophy,  even
among  developed  countries.
The present paper, commissioned  from Kenneth  M. Wright, a former director of the American  Council
of Life Insurance, provides an overview of the structure, performance and regulation of the US life
insurance industry.  Although the US life industry is highly complex, it is hoped that its impressive
record of innovation and the way it deals with issues of market structure, solvency regulation and
insurance  taxation would  have useful lessons  for developing  countries.
The paper is part of a series of reports on contractual  savings institutions  that address economic  and
regulatory policy issues and aim to stimulate  policy reform in developing  countries.
Dimitri
Vittas
Financial  rPoicy and
Systems  DivisionI.  INTRODUCTION
The economic  and social  functions  of life insurance  companies  in the United States  are aimed at
providing  financial security to individuals  and families in two basic ways.  First, life insurance offers
protection  against the financial risk of premature  death of a family member and the consequent  loss of
income  to the surviving  family. Second, annuities  and pension  plans protect against  the risk of outliving
other forms  of income,  particularly after retirement  from active  employment. In serving these needs, life
insurance  companies  are a major source of long-term funds to the domestic capital market through the
investment  of their reserves in a wide range of financial  outlets.
Total assets of U.S. life insurance companies  were $1,408 billion at the end of 1990, equal to
26 percent of GNP. Of these, roughly  one third arose from policy reserves  behind life insurance  and two
thirds were reserves against annuities and pension plans.  Such assets rose by $108 billion in the year
1990, with the bulk of these net new funds made available  to the financial markets through investment
in long-term  corporate  debt obligations,  mortgages  on commercial  real estate, U.S. Treasury and federal
agency securities, and corporate equity issues.
Life insurance  was  owned by 81 percent of American  households  in 1990  with an average amount
of coverage of $121,400 or roughly three times the size of average  famnily  income. The face amount  of
life insurance in force was $9.392 billion or 174%  of GNP-an increase  of 8.0 percent for the year.
Death benefits  on life insurance  policies were $25 billion in 1990, while another  $18 billion was
paid  to policyholders  in surrender values  and $12 billion in policy  dividends. Payments  on annuities  with
life companies  were just under $33 billion.
Premiums  paid on life insurance  are currently 2 percent of disposable  personal ini;ome  (DPI),
down from a 3 percent level twenty years ago.  An upsurge in annuity purchases has more than offset
this declining  trend, however, with annuity  considerations  (individual  and group) rising from 0.5 percent
of DPI in 1969  to 3.0 percent in 1989. Thus, total life premiums  and annuity  considerations  have risen
to 5 percent of DPI, compared with 3.5 percent 20 years ago.
The life insurance  industry  in the United  States  has long  played a major role in generating  savings
,Vailable  to the money and capital markets. Federal Reserve  data show a total of $629 billion in credit
provided by all types of institutions  and investors in the U.S. capital market in 1989.  Life insurance
companies  supplied $98 billion or 16 percent of the total in that year, second only to commercial  banks
which supplied  27 percent of the total.
The broad dimensions  of the U.S. life insurance  and pension  field in 1989  are shown in summary
form in Table 1.
At the latest count, there were 2,343 life insurance  companies in the United States, of which
about ',200 companies are currently active; the others have been legally chartered  but do not carry on
current operations. Just under half of total industry assets  are held by the 118 mutual companies  while
stock companies,  though much larger in number, represent the remaining  half of industry assets.  The
three largest  companies  are organized as mutuals;  together, they account for 23 percent of total industry
assets. The ten largest life insurance  companies,  both stock and mutual, hold 43 percent of total industry
1assets. Insurance  holding  companies  often are owners  of several  other stock companies,  forming  a 'fleet"
operation which combines  certain central  functions  such as investment  management  into a single office.
An  international aspect of life  insurance operations does exist, although  t  is  limited in
magnitude. A few U.S. life companies  sell insurance in Canada, Latin America, Europe or Japan in
limited  quantities. A number  of Canadian  life companies  also market their products in the United  States,
largely in the states close to the northern  border with Canada. In addition, European financial  interests
based in Germany, France and the Netherlands  own or control U.S.-based life insurance companies.
While no firm data are available  on cross-  border sales by "alien" life insurance  companies  based outside
the United  States, the actual  dollar volume  is believed  to be quite small within the U.S. total. In general,
asset data cited in this study refer to life iusurance  companies  domiciled  in the United  States.
Table I
Summary  Data, 1989
Dollar  Percent
Amount  of GNP
(in billions)
Life Insurance  reserves  340  6.5
Insured pension reserves  738  14.2
Other private pension funds  1,050  20.2
State and local government
employee  retirement  funds  727  14.0
Total non-federal  2,855  54.9
Life insurance in force  8,694  167.2
Life insurance  purchases  Percent
of DPI
Face amount  1,442  38.7
Life insurance premiums  73  2.0
Annuity considerations  115  3.0
The plan of this paper is to first describe  the characteristics  of life insurance  and annuity  products
offered by U.S. companies, followed  by a discussion  of the fiscal incentives  and tax treatment afforded
2to these products. The investment  operations  of life companies  will then be examined  in detail, including
their role in various segments  of the U.S. capital market. The regulatory  system which  governs insurance
company  operations  arul provides consumer  protection  will then be described at some length, followed
by a brief section on the profitability  and investment  retunrs of the life insurance industi-y. A final
section will outline the leading  policy issues  that are current in the regulation,  taxation  arnd  operation  of
life insurance  companies in the United  States.
311.  LIEZ INSURANCE  AND ANNUITY  PRODIJjTS
Thbree  basic  forms  of life insurance  products  may  be distinguished:  (1) whole-life,  (2) term life,
and (3)  annuities.  Within  each  category,  there  are  numerous  varieties  and  refinements  which  can provide
almost  any  form of protection  to iieet the  particular  needs  of the insurance  client,  but the emphasis  here
will be confined  to the standard  forms  of insurance.
a.  Whole-life  Insurance
Sometimes  known  as permanent  insurance  or cash-value  life insurance,  traditional  whole life
insurance  is based  on a lwvel-premium  method  of payment,  whereby  the  policyholder  pays  an unchanging
periodic  amount  for the entire  life of the contract,  normally  until  the death  of the insured.  In the early
years  of the policy,  premiums  are higher  than needed  to meet the average  of deat! claims  at younger
ages;  thus, a reserve  is accumulated  to meet the higher  number  of death  claims  at later ages  when  the
premium  payment  remains  level. Because  there  is a sizeable  reserve  build-up  behind  whole-life  contracts,
such  policies  have  a cash  surrender  value  and  they  typically  carry  a policy  loan  privilege.
Mutual  companies  selling  whole  life policies  allow  the policyholder  to participate  in any  excess
earnings  on reserves,  through  policy  dividends  paid  out  to the insured  or used  to buy  additional  coverage.
In this way,  the net cost  of insurance  may  be less  than  the gross  premiums  required  under  the contract.
Stock  companies  have  also  offered  participating  policies,  but  non-participating  policies  are  more  standard,
allowing  any  excess  earnings  above  the assumed  rate  to remain  with  the  company  as shareholder  profits.
In the early 1980s,  new  forms  of whole  life  policies  were  developed,  primarily  in response  to the
surge  in inflation  rates  and  market  interest  rates  to double-digit  levels  during  the 1978-1982  period  in the
United  States. With  fixed  dollar  amounts  on the  face  value  of insurance  policies,  the  real  value  of future
deati benefits  was  jeopardized  by persistent  inflation.  Reacting  to this  threat  to insurance  purchases,  life
companies  developed  three new  for.ns  of "interest-sensitive"  policies-universal  life, variable  life, and
flexible  premium  variable  life. All  three  had  the common  element  of reflecting  investment  performance
in the  policies,  by changing  the size  of the death  benefit  or the annual  premium  or both  over the  duration
of the policy.
Under  universal  life, the policyholder  is able  to vary his annual  premiums  as to the amount  and
timing  of payments.  Net premiums  (after  loading  and  mortality  risk  charges)  are invested  in a floating
rate  fund,  and  the earned  interest  credited  to the  policy  will  vary  with investment  results. Death  benefits
cannot  fall below  the face  value  of the policy,  but  they  can expire  if the level  of premium  payments  or
the investment  exnerience  is not  sufficient  to carry  the policy  ti maturity.  Thus,  the buyer  assumes  some
of the investment  risk, but  he also  can  share  directly  in the rewards  of good  performance.  In 1989,  $275
billion  of universal  life was  purchased,  which  was 16  percent  of the sales  of ordinary  life (whole-life  and
term life)  in that  year.
Somewhat  less  successful  was  the  new  product  called  variable  life,  which  sold  less  than  $7 billion
in 1989. Variable  life carries  a fixed  annual  premium  but  allows  the policyholder  to designate  investment
of his funds  into  bonds,  equities,  or a money  market  account  and  to vary his choice  during  the  life of the
policy  as he sees  fit. There  is a guaranteed  minimum  death  benefit,  but the size of the benefit  will rise
or fall over time,  depending  on investment  performance.
4A combined  version of the two previous policy types is flexible  premium variable  life, wherein
premium  payments  .nay vary and a choice  of investment  media can be made. Death  benefits will  depend
on investment  returns on the asse s standing  behind  the policy. Purchases  of this product  were $36 billion
in 1989.
Taken together, these  three forms of interest-sensitive  life insurance  captured a 32 percent share
of ordinary  life sales by 1987,  at the expense  of traditional  cash-value  insurance  and also cutting into the
market for term insurance. However, with the reduced level of inflation  and market interest rates in the
United States  more recently, the market share of interest-sensitive  policies has declined  to 24 percent.
b.  Term lnsuirance
This popular form of ordinary insurance differs in major respects from whole life, primarily
because  it is offered  for a specified  number  of years, usually  one, two or five years. During the specified
time, the premium  is unchanged,  based on the attained  age of the insured. At younger ages, the premium
is substantially  lower than for cash-value  life, but the premium increases sharply in later years as the
likelihood  of death increases  on average. Term insurance  is underwritten  largely on a "pay-as-you-go"
basis whereby current claims can be met from the inflow of current premiums paid by those covered
under this system.  Thus, little reserve is accumulated  for investment  in the financial markets to fund
future death claims.
Because term insurance is the least expensive form of coverage, it appeals largely to younger
adults and those with lower incomes. It generates minimal amounts  of savings and provides no policy
loan  privileges  or cash surrender  values. Those who  purchase  term insurance  are often urged to undertake
a companion savings program in other forms, but these do not represent contractual savings on  a
continuing  basis.  When the policyholder  reaches later years of life, the cost of term insurance can be
prohibitively expensive, leading to dropping of the policy (lapsation) and a consequent absence of
coverage. In the event of a major  health problem, a policyholder  may find that his term insurance  cannot
be renewed, since a physical examination  is typically required whenever a new policy is purchased.
However, some term policies are written to permit automatic  renewal without  a health review, but at a
higher premium.
In the mid-1980s,  purchases  of term insurance  rose to a peak level of 60 percent of ordinary  life
sold to individuals,  but then declined in later years to 41 percent of total purchases by 1989, apparently
because  of the attraction of the new interest-sensitive  policies which provided  some aspects  of inflation
hedging and shared much  of the investment  results with the policy owner.
In addition to individual  purchases, term insurance  is marketed in large volume through group
insurance, whereby a master policy is issuea to an employer to cover all employees  as a fringe benefit
in addition to wages and salaries. A typical  method is for the employer  to provide  group term insurimce
equal to 1, 1-1/2, or 2 times the annual salary level of each employee.  As a rule, physical  examinations
are not required of those under the group contract, since it is assumed  that employees  currently at work
are in good health. Most  plans cover all employees  in the working  group, thus avoiding  adverse  selection
by those in poor health, or by higher-paid  employees  who would receive  larger amounts  of coverage, or
by older ernployees  who stand to gain more from such coverage than the younger workers.  Since
administrative  expenses are low, this form of insurance is relatively inexpensive  and has grown rapidly
as an cmployee  benefit. If the employee  leaves the firm, his insurance  coverage  is normally terminated,
5but is some-times  contipued  if the employee  has retired. At the end of 1989, group life insuraice (largely
term) represented  40 percent of the face amount oi life insurance  in force in the United  States.
c.  Other Life In.uraiiee Forms
In addition  to the basic  po!icy  types described  above, two other insurance  forms exist, though in
minor amounts.  One type is called  industrial  life, issued in amounts  usually  under $1,0X0  with premiums
collected door-to-door on a weekly or  monthly basis  Primarily sold to low-income groups, such
insurance  is often meant to cover burial expenses. The outstanding  number  of such policies  has declined
to about one third the level of 30 years zgo.
The other minor form of insurance  is called  credit insurance,  desigped  to repay a mortgage  loan
or installment  loan in case the borrower dies.  Such insurance is often required as a condition  of a loan
to an individual,  or is offered as a relaL_d  option. Credit insurance  is term insurance,  usually  decreasing
in amotnt in keeping  with scheduled  repayments  of a mortgage  or an auto loan.  The lending institution
or retailer normally handles  the sale of credit insurance,  which is actuallv  underwritten  by iife insurance
companies.  About $260 billion of such insurance is presently in force, and the average size of such
policies is $3,600.
d.  Annuities-Individual and Group
Annuities  are designed  to provide  continuing  income  to protect  against the possibility  of outliving
other forms of income, usually beginning with retirement from active employment.  They can be
purchased  with a single  payment  to provide an immediate  or deferred  stream of income, or with a series
of payments  sufficient  to provide  a stream  of income  to begin at some future date. Annuities  can provide
income for the lifetime of an individual, or a joint-and-survivorship  annuity can cover income for a
surviving spouse  or child, usualiy i  a reduced amount.
Since annuities are related to life expectancies  under a pooling principle, they are a form of
insurance  which requires application  of underwriting  techniques  and the use of mortality tables.  If an
annuitant  dies before the expected  life span, the unused annuity  amounts  can be applied to payments  for
those living beyond their calculated  life expectancy. The cost of an annuity is closely related to the age
of covered individuals, but also depends on the projected investment  return on amounts paid to the
company (known  as annuity  considerations).
In 1989, U.S. life companies  received  $115 billion in annuity  considerations,  compared  with $73
billion in premiums  on life insurance  policies. Individual  annuities  brought in $49 billion, of which $33
billion was from single-premium  annuities  which provide  attractive  tax advantages  to the purchaser. By
far the largest amount, however, came from group annuities  related to pension plans, at $66 billion
1989.
While a detailed  examination  of insured  pension  plans is beyond the scope of this paper, a review
of some basic techniques  may be helpful. A variety of arrangements  between employers  and insur  e
companies  may be used, but the predominant  methods  today are the single  premium  deferrt,  annuity  a.d
the deposit  administration  plan. Under the former, the e nployer  purchases  an annuity  each y,ar for each
employee, sufficient  to provide the pension which is due on retirement, usually  dependent on length of
service and salary level.  At retirement, the sum of the annuity units purchased then determines  the
pension  which the life company  pays to the employee. In deposit  administration  plans, the employer  sets
6up a single furnd  for all employees  eligible  for a pension, which fund is then drawn upon to purchase  an
annuity for each employee  at the time he retires.
It should be noted that some corporate  pension plans are fanded with bank trust departrpents  or
self-administered  by the business  firm itself. When  an employee  retires, a withdrawal  is made from such
funds to purchase the necessary  annuity from a life insurance  company; or, a lump-sum  is paid to the
employee  which can theni  be used to purchase  a life company  annuity  or invested  directly by the retirce
to provide retirement income.
For those who are self-employed.  such as doctors, lawyers, ard owners of small firms, special
laws allow them to build  pension benefits  in other ways, broadly  parallel to those available  to employees
of corporate businesses. Under the so-called Keogh Plans, a percentage  of compensation  up to a fixed
dollar amount  may be used to purchase  retirement  benefits  from a life insurance  company  for the owner
and his employees.
Another form of supplementary  retirement income arises from "thrift plans" for employees,
whereby  voluntary  contributions  are made into a fund which is placed with an insurance  compa.;, to earn
tax-deferred  interest  or dividends,  building  savings  that are not available  to the emoloyee  until retirement
but not before age 59-1/2.  Such contributions,  up to specified  limits, are deductible  from the otherwise
taxable income of the employee. To encourage  this form of thrift, employers  often match the first two
or three percent of salaries paid into the plan by employees. These tax-sv  eltered plans are known as
401(k) plans, 501(c)(3) annuities  or 403(b) plans, referring to the sections  of the Internal Revenue  Code
which authorized  them, and they have become increasingly  important in dollar volume over the past
decade.
National  policy  to encourage  retirement  savings  also created in 1981  a revised  form of Individual
Retirement  Accounts (ORAs)  by which working individuals  cculd contribute  to a retirement fund up to
$2,000 from wages and salaries, and deduct such amounts  from taxable income.  Withdrawals were
taxable as ordinary income although  they could not be made until age 59-1/2 but could be deferred until
age 70 while building  up tax-deferred  earnings  on these assets. Since IRA contributions  were not linked
to employer arrangements,  this form of retirement  saving had the added  advantage  of complete  portability
for those who changed employers.  In  1986, however, this legislation was changed to  limit the
arrangement  to those employees  not covered  under an employer  pension  plan.  Under the 1981-86  form
of IRAs, contributions  could  be channeled  into a variety  of forms, including  banks and thrift institutions,
mutual funds, and brokerage accounts  as well as life companies.
e.  Nonlife Insurance Lines  of B_usiness
In addition to life insurance  and annuities, many life insurance  companies in the United States
offer other insurance  lines, notably  health insurance  and property  and casualty  insurance. Several  leading
companies, such as Aetria, Travelers, Nationwide and Allstate have long been engaged in selling
automobile  insurance, homeowners insurance  and related casualty lines, while a number of larger life
companies  more recently have added such business lines to their operation by establishing  subsidiary
companies  to supplement  their traditional  products and to diversify  their operations.
Health insurance is offered  by almost all of the larger life insurance  companies, in competition
with those companies that specialize in health insurance for  individuals, business employees, and
affiliation  groups.  Health insurance  premium receipts of life companies  totaled $56 billion in 1989, as
7against $188 billion in receipts from life insurance and annuities.  Reserves against health insurance
operations,  however. were less than  3 percent of total policy reserves  of life companies  and the generation
of investable  funds from health insurance  is negligible.
Nonlife insurance lines are typically handled by subsidiary companies that are established or
ac4uired under a holding  company  form of organization,  which is widely permitted  under state laws that
govern company  operations. In recent years, life companies  have  become interested  in moving  into  other
forms of financial services, including securities broke"oge  and underwriting, mutual funds, mor.gage
companies,  real estate brokerage,  real estate  management,  investment  advisory  services, and pension  plan
management. Several companies  own savings and loan association  subsidiaries,  but life companies  are
barred by federal laws (and some state laws) from acquiring a commercial  bank subsidiary. Similarly,
under current law. commercial  banks -nay not sell or underwrite insurance. except in a very few states
where state-chattered  banks  have been allowed  to sell insurance  under laws enacted  in the 1930s  or 1940s
and still in force. However, federal and state legislative proposals to remove the barriers between
insurance  and banking  continue  to be under active  consideration  in the United States  at the present  time.
r.  Markeingjad  Distribution  Systems
It has long been recognized that the sale of life insurance requires an aggressive marketing
system, primarily  because  of the resistance  of many individuals  to contemplate  the prospect  of their own
death. or to give up present income  to provide for a hopefully  distant event.  It is often said that "life
insurance  is not bought, it must be sold". Because  of the inherent  complexity  of the product, in the effort
to meet the varying personal needs of individual  customers,  the sale of life insurance typically  requires
the use of face-to- face discussions  between  insurance  salespersons  and potential clients.
A variety of distribution systems are in use by U.S. life insurance companies  to market their
policies.  These include the career agents, the general agents, insurance  brokers, the mutual funds and
securities dealers.  In addition, mass merchandising  through mail order and advertising in newspapers,
magazines  and television  has become more important  in recent yeaws.
Career agents  usually  are employees  of the company,  responsible  for managing  an agency  which
recruits, trains, and oversees a number  of salespersons. They receive salaries and normal benefits, but
have no ownership  rights in the agency. In contrast, general agents have rights to the agency business
and they often are Fersonal  producers as active salesmen; they typically hire and train a small number
of salespersons  to  supplement  their own sales efforts.  The exact responsibilities  and compensation
arrangements  of career agents and general agents  depend on the policies of the home office companies
they serve, and no exact distinction  between  these two forms is feasible.
Insurance brokers, also known  as independent  life agen$s,  do not serve a single company  but
normally place business  with a number of different companies,  depending  on the product line involved.
They often handle property-casualty  insurance  lines as well as life insurance  and annuities. Also, since
those salespersons  who sell mutual funds and securities are in touch with clients with insurance needs,
many of these individuals have become licensed to  sell life  insurance products as well.  In fact,
tax-sheltered  annuities offered by life companies  have became  a particular speciality  oi brokerage  firms
and securities salesmen in recent years, dealing as they do with upper-income  clients in higher tax
brackets.
8Mass marketing  through direct advertising  and mail-order  is typically based on more simplified
policy types than are handled  by agents  working  on a personalized  basis.  Sales through affinity  groups,
such as college  alumni  associations  or professional  organizations  has become  more common,  using  master
contracts  with individual  policies  for purchasers. Insurance  sold  through mass marketing  typically  waives
the need for physical examinations  to screen for health problems, in contrast to the normal requirement
for writing individual  insura'ice.  By trimming sales expense  and administrative  overhead, mail-order
insurance  is often available  at lower premiums,  though it is not able to tailo" the policy to the particular
needs of the insured.
Agents' conunissions  for lit%  insurance  typically involve a fairly high first-year commission,
followed  by stepped-down  commissions  for the successive  three to five years of renewals.  The logic of
the renewal commissions  is to provide an incentive  for the agent to keep  the policy in force, maintaining
contact with the policyholder  and providing  whatever  service may be needed. In most states, agents are
strictly forbidden to rebate any part of their commission  to the client, although anti-rebate  laws have
recently  been  challenged  in court cases. Commissions  usually  differ according  to the type of product  sold
(term vs. permanent insurance) and sales of group insurance  receive a different commiission  structure
from individual  sales.
Agents'  commissions are limited by  state law  in  New York State, both as to  first-year
commissions  and renewals.  These limits also apply to the great majority of insurance sold, since
companies that are licensed in New York State are not allowed to  pay more than the stipulated
commissions  on policies sold in any other state in which they operate.  A typical commission  scale on
cash-value  life policies is 55 percent of the first year premium, followed  by 10 percent in each  of the next
three years.  For term life insurance, commissions  are considerably  lower.  Prizes and bonuses for
superior sales performance  by agents  are restricted  to awards of low monetary value, so that regulatory
limits on conunissions  are not circumvented.
9111.  FISCAL INCENTIVES
a.  General Tax Principles
Life insurance and annuities sold both to individuals  and to employers  in the United States  are
greatly influenced by the tax treatment accorded such products under federal laws.  It should be
understood  that the tax system applied to U.S. insurance  policies may differ widely  from that of other
advanced  nations, with the result that the relative attraction  of a given  product or contract  in one country
may not apply to a similar policy sold under another tax system.
Fiscal incentives  for insurance  products under U.S. laws and regulations  are designed  to serve
well-recognized  social and economic  functions. To quote from a recent tax study by the U.S. Treasury
Department:
The principal justifications  for the current tax treatment of life insurance and annuity
products are to encourage  the provision  of financial  support of dependents  after the death
of a wage earner, to allow protection against outliving one's assets, and to encourage
private long-term  savings'.
In practice, the taxability of insurance  products varies widely according to the nature of the
product,  whether  it is purchased  by individuals  as life insurance  or an annuity  or by business  firms as part
of an employee  pension plan.  There are three basic issues of taxability in connection  with insurance
products. The first is concerned  with whether investment  earnings  arising  from such products  should be
exempt from tax, or taxed at some deferred time, or subject to immediate  income tax along with other
forms of income.  A second tax issue applies to pensions and retirement savings plans, as to whether
contributions to  such plans may be deducted from taxable income, either by the employee or the
employer. The third tax issue is whether  federal estate taxes (as distinct from income  taxes) are levied
on proceeds from life insurance  and from survivorship  annuities.
b.  Products Sold to Individuals as Insurance or Annuities
Death benefits from a life insurance  policy are not subject to income  taxes upon receipt by the
policy beneficiaries.  For this reason, investment  income  earned on most life insurance  policies held until
death is, in effect, exempt from federal income taxes.  Under whole-life policies, where the interest
earned on the accumulated  reserves is built up over many  years, the amount  of investment  earnings  used
to pay eventual  death claims is considerable. But such earnings, known  as "the inside buildup," escape
payment of income tax entirely  under U.S. law.  Such  treatment is in contrast  to the taxability  of current
earnings  on many  other forms of long-term savings  by individuals,  e.g., corporate  bonds or stocks, bank
certificates  of deposit,  or U.S. Treasury  bonds. Hence, saving through cash-value  life insurance  is often
described as "tax advantaged".
Cash-value or permanent life insurance also has a clear tax advantage  over term life.  If an
individual  chooses  to purchase  term life, with a lower premium than cash value life, he could invest  the
difference  each year in marketable  securities, for example, and possibly earn more than the insurance
I  Department  of  the  Treasury,  Report  to  the  Congress  on  the  Taxation
of  Life  Insurance  Company  Products,  March  1990.
10company is crediting on cash value policies.  But the earnings on marketable securities are subject to
income tax, year by year, while  the inside  buildup  of earnings  on cash value life is permanently  exempt
from income  tax.  That portion  of market interest  that is taxed away from the term life buyer cannot  be
reinvested  to build up the investable  principal.  Hence, cash-value  life has an obvious advantage  over
term life as far as taxes are concerned.
Endowment insurance, once a popular savings technique to accumulate  funds for children's
college education  or for retirement, has declined  sharply as an insurance  product in recent years for tax
reasons.  Since 1984, the U.S. tax laws no longer consider most endowment  policies as meeting  the
definition  of life insurance;  hence, interest  credited  to such policies is subject  to income  taxation  year by
year.  Sales of such policies  currently  represent less  than one half of 1  percent of new ordinary  insurance
sales.
If an individual  withdraws  part of his cash value prior to death, through a partial surrender or
a policy loan, such moneys  are likewise  not subject  to income  taxation. However, if the amount  of such
withdrawals  exceeds the cumulative  premiums paid on the policy (net of policy dividends),  then the
excess  amount is deemed  to be taxable income  arising  from investment  earnings. In this way, the tax law
seeks to thwart an improper use of life insurance  to avoid taxes on interest earnings, rather than its
normal purpose to provide death benefits.
Death benefits  are normally  subject to federal (and state) inheritance  or estate taxes, whether  the
policy is payable to an individual  beneficiary  or to the decedent's estate, so long as the decedent was
considered  the owner of the policy, with powers to change beneficiaries, surrender the policy, obtain
loans, etc.  In this regard, life insurance  proceeds are taxed on much the same basis as other property
or financial assets held by the deceased. This tax treatment also applies to group life policies  provided
by an employer, as a general  rule. Under federal law, however, the first $600,000  of an estate is exempt
from tax and the estate left to a spouse is fully exempt  from tax. In practice, therefore, federal and state
estate taxes are not a major  source of government  revenue. For very wealthy  individuals,  estate  planning
can minimize  taxes through a variety of trust arrangements  or shelters.
Income  tax treatment  of annuities  is far more complicated  than for life insurance,  and there have
been numerous changes in the Internal Revenue Code designed to prevent abusive use of individual
annuities to escape or reduce income taxes.  In general, the inside buildup of earnings on annuity
contracts is deferred, but some part of annuity  payments  is usually  subject  to taxation. If loans are made
from an annuity contract before scheduled  distributions  have started, such pre-annuity  distributions  are
taxed to the extent of the inside buildup on the contract.  When annuity payments are made, part is
considered as a return of the policyholder's investments  and is not taxed; the balance is viewed as
investment  earnings and is taxed as ordinary income. The underlying  philosophy  of the tax authorities
seems to be that annuities should be allowed deferral of tax until payments start, but should not be
manipulated  in a way that provides  undue tax advantages  over retirement  savings in such forms as bonds
and stocks.  Nevertheless,  retirement savings are highly favored  under the tax laws in order to achieve
the objectives  stated above.
c.  Tax Treatment of Pension and Thrift Plans
For corporate employers,  pension plans became  a standard  form of "fringe benefit" in the early
1950s,  supplementing  cash wages  and salaries. The simplest  example  of a corporate  pension  plan is when
the employer contributes the entire amount to the fund; this payment is considered  a business  expense
11equivalent  to wages and salaries and thus is fully deductible in the calculation  of his taxable income.
When  the resulting  pension is paid to the retired employec,  such income  is fully  taxable  under the income
tax laws.
In other plans, the employee  contributes toward the pension fund, while the employer usually
contributes  a portion as well. However, the employee's  contribution  is not deductible  from his taxable
income, i.e., he pays with after-tax  dollars. When  he receives  his pension after retirement,  only part of
his payment is subject  to income  taxes, depending  upon a calculation  of the amount  he has earlier invested
in the plar through his periodic contributions.
Supplements  to the basic pension  system have grown rapidly  over the past decade, largely in the
form of  employer-based  thrift  plans,  sanctioned by  Section 401(k) of the  tax laws.  Employee
contributions  to the retirement fund are deductible  from taxable income up to specified  percentages  of
income or dollar ceilings.  Earnings on such funds, managed by life insurance companies and other
fiduciaries, are tax-deferred. After age 59-1/2, the entire corpus of contributions  and earnings can be
withdrawn  as a lump-sum  subject to favorable income  tax rates, or converted into an annuity on which
normal income taxes are paid.  In brief, the individual  receives a tax break on money he places in the
401(k)  plan, defers taxes  on earnings,  and withdraws  retirement  savings  at a special  tax rate for lump-sum
distributions.
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are  another form  of  retirement savings with tax
advantages.  Employees who have no pension plan with their employer may place up to  $2,000 of
earnings  into an IRA with an insurance  company, bank, brokerage firm, etc.  and deduct such amounts
from earnings in calculating  their taxable income.  No withdrawals  are permitted before age 59-1/2
without  substantial  penalties,  but after  that age, full or partial  withdrawals  can be made  with such amounts
taxed at normal tax rates.  As noted above, in  1981 these tax benefits were also made available to
employees  covered  by employer  pension  plans, and this form of tax shelter was widely  used by workers
in all income groups.  This privilege was withdrawn in the 1986 tax revision, largely to reduce the
revenue losses that had resulted.
To encourage retirement  savings  by sole proprietors  and business  partners  outside the corporate
sector, tax laws in 1962 established  so-called  Keogh plans in which both employees  and employers in
such firms could deduct from taxable income  their contributions  to a retirement fund.  Earnings were
tax-deferred  and withdrawals  were prohibited  until age 59-1/2. Broadly similar plans are also available
to employees  of nonprofit organizations  of a religious, charitable, educational  or similar purpose, to
provide  somewhat  equal footing  with corporate business  employees. These are known as 501(c)(3)  plans
and 403(b) plans, referring to sections of the tax code.  Such funds are managed by life insurance
companies  and other fiduciaries.
d.  Group Term Life Insurance
Another common form of employee "fringe benefit" by business firms has been group life
insurance which covers all employees, in amounts based on annual salary.  For the employers, the
premiums for such insurance are deductible from taxable income; for the employees, the value of
premiums  paid for insurance  coverage up to $50,000 is not subject  to income tax. For coverage  beyond
this limit, a calculation  is made for the premium value of the additional amount of insurance and the
employee  is required  to pay income  taxes on this excess  premium. Nevertheless,  the employee  normally
12receives insurance at a cost (often zero) far below what he would pay for an individual  policy with
identical coverage.
e.  Further  Observations
Because  life insurance  and annuity contracts  are infinitely  variable  in their structure and design,
current tax laws and regulations  are highly  complex  and the foregoing  outline of tax treatment is far from
complete. Broadly  stated, the federal tax laws have provided  substantial  tax advantages  to the various
forms of retirement plans, largely by deferring taxes to be paid on income used to fund pensions and
thrift plans or investment  income earned on accumulated  reserves.  Investment  earnings  on traditional
cash-value life insurance policies have been permanently exempted from income taxation, though
proposals to remove this exemption  have been urged on the Congress in recent years as a revenue
measure to reduce budget deficits.
To avoid  abuse of these tax privileges, the tax authorities  have sought  to distinguish  between  life
insurance and annuity products sold for investment  purposes as opposed to  insurance protection or
retirement  benefits. Their approach  has been to define  tax-qualified  life insurance  as those contracts  that
provide for smaller investments  or buildups  of cash value than can be provided  under a single premium
policy.  Because of the growing share of investment-oriented  insurance and annuity products which
emerged after 1980, closer scrutiny  has been given to the characteristics  of such products, to rule out
those which involve an insufficient  degree of pure insurance  protection.
Within the life insurance industry, the tax-free "inside buildup" from investment  earnings on
cash-value  life insurance is considered  to be the keystone  of their product lines, essential  to the success
of whole-life  policy sales.  Other product lines which involve  tax deferral are important,  of course, but
not to the extent of whole-life policies which are marketed by virtually every life company in the
business.
13IV.  INVESTMENT AS$ETS
a.  Guiding Principles of Investment Policy
Investment  practices  of life insurance  companies  are shaped  by two key factors: the nature  of the
liabilities  froin insurance and annuities  on their books, and the restrictions imposed  by state insurance
regulators on their investments.
As to the nature of liabilities,  not all life insurance  companies  offer the same  mix of product  lines.
Many  larger companies  provide  employee  pension  and thrift planr, while  a greater number  do not.  Some
companies  specialize in particular  products, such as credit life or single-premium  annuities, while  others
concentrate on traditional whole-life policies. Interest-sensitive  products such as universal life were
introduced  by a large number  of companies  during the past decade, but many others have not attempted
to market such policies. Because  of this diversity  in product mix, there is no typical  or standard  pattern
for the range of company  liabilities;  consequently,  there is no standard  pattern for the mix of investment
assets. In the Discussion  that follows, industry  totals and averages  will be shown, but such data should
not be taken as reflecting  the practices  of a typical or 'average" company.
A fundamental  principle of life company investment  practices is the matching of assets and
liabilities  according  to (a) duration or average life, (b) need for liquidity  to meet possible withdrawals,
and (c) earnings  performance  to maintain  competitive  position. In earlier  times, when whole-life  policies
were the predominant  product, death benefits  were normally preceded  by 30 years or more of premium
receipts and reserves could  be invested in long- term bonds or real estate mortgages with maturities  of
25 or 30 years.  The net inflow of premiums, augmented  by investment  income and amortization,
normally exceeded  the outflow of death benefits so that total assets were constantly  rising and the need
for liquidity  was small. In contrast, many  of the investment-oriented  products marketed  in the last decade
have shorter duration and require greater liquidity  than was needed  in earlier years.
Asset/liability  matching  today often involves  setting up a series of segmented  asset accounts or
portfolios,  with each account  designed  to stand behind  a particular  class of policies  or product line. Thus,
the portfolio mix assigned to the universal life policy line would require shorter maturities and more
liquid assets than those used to back traditional cash- value life policies. In the case of employee  thrift
plans, where funds can  be readily  switched  on short notice  to another carrier, it would  be unwise  to invest
incoming funds in longer-term securities.  Moreover, such thrift plans often allow the  individual
participants  to redirect  their funds  between  fixed-income  accounts  and equity accounts  at any time, so that
the uncertain  duration of such money  requires readily liquifiable  investments. Corporate pension plans
have  made increasing  use of guaranteed  investment  contracts  (GICs) which  specify  a fixed  period of three
to five years before withdrawal  or renewal; investment  of such funds by the insurer must take account
of the probable duration  of the arrangement. Close working relations between investment  officers and
marketing executives  have become essential to developing  the appropriate match for maturities, risk
elements, liquidity  and investment  yield.
State investment  laws have clearly shaped the investment  policies of life companies,  by setting
forth quantitative  limits  on the percentage  of assets  permitted  in various  forms, and by requiring  minimum
credit standards  on permitted investments.  Although  these laws differ in their specific content from state
to state, they have focussed  on the diversification  of assets among  permitted investment  outlets, along
with qualitative  standards for the safety  of principal  amounts  invested. Further description  of these state
14investment laws is presented in the sections below, which outline activities in each of the major
investment  markets in which life companies  operate.
b.  Life Insurance  Industry Mix of Assets
At the end of 1990, U.S. life insurance  companies  held total assets  of $1,408 billion, ar. increase
of 8.6 percent in that calendar  year. By far the largest investment  category  was corporate bonds  of $536
billion, or 38 percent of total assets.  Real estate mortgage loans, largely on commercial  properties,
totalled  $270 billion or 19 percent of total assets, while directly-owned  real estate was $43 billion or 3
percent. Life company  holdings of U.S. Treasury and federal agency securities represented another 13
percent of assets or $176 billion.  Corporate equity holdings, common  and preferred, aggregated  $129
billion or 9 percent of total assets. Short-term  commercial  paper held for liquidity  purposes accounted
for another $41 billion or 3 percent of industry assets.
Investments  in securities of foreign governments  and intern-.ional agencies have always been
small, partly because  of legal restrictions  but primarily  from lack of familiarity  with these markets. At
year-end 1990, such holdings were $17 billion or just over one percent of total assets.  Investments  in
foreign corporate debt obligations,  both long- and short-term,  were $32 billion or 2 percent of industry
assets, of which a major share was in Canadian  securities.
Policy loans make up another 4 percent of industry  assets, or $62 million. Such loans are taken
at the option of  the policyholder, as provided in  cash-value life contracts, and they often are at
below-market  interest rates, particularly if an older policy is drawn upon.  While policy loans are
considered  invested  assets, they are not initiated  or welcomed  by investment  officers who would prefer
to place funds in more profitable  outlets.
In the sections  that follow, the role of the major investment  outlets will be examined  in greater
detail, including  the characteristics  of such investments,  the investment  laws that affect these investments,
and recent trends in the relative importance  of such assets in company  portfolios.
c.  Corporate Debt Obligations
Corporate  bonds, notes and debenture  have  been for many  decades  a leading investment  medium
for life insurance  companies. During the 1920s  and 1930s,  the main focus  was on obligations  of railroads
and public utilities  which were considered  at the time to have the safest capacity for debt service. The
economic expansion following World War II  brought major financing demands from  industrial
corporations  and life companies  provided  a major share of the long-term  financing  sought  by these firms
to expand  their plant and equipment. By the 1960s,  life companies  also had become major suppliers of
financing  for oil and gas pipelines,  jet aircraft, and other transportation  equipment,  responding  to market
developments  amnong  new industries  in the postwar  years. Currently,  the largest  category  of bondholdings
is "finance",  which includes  mortgage-backed  securities  as well  as issues  by various financial  institutions.
The manufacturing  sector occupies  second place, followed  by bond issues of public utilities in the third
largest category.
Life companies  have developed a lending technique  known as "private placements' wherein  a
borrower deals  directly with the provider  of long-term  finance, by-passing  the public issue market which
relies on investment  bankers to distribute the securities  to a variety of investors. Because  of their size,
15larger life companies  are often in a position  to take the entire issue of a corporate borrower, rather than
a portion of a public issue sold through inves.ment bankers.  Moreover, private placements allow
borrower  and lender to negotiate  the specific  terms of a tailor-made  indenture  satisfactory  to both parties.
This technique  also saves  the costs of preparing  prospectuses,  registering  the issue  with the Securities  and
Exchange  Commission,  and paying  commissions  to the underwriters--making  the loan less expensive  than
a public issue.  Through the 1960s  and 1970s, life companies acquired 75 percent or more of their
corporate bond investments  through private placements. In the 1980s, however, the share of private
placements  fell off sharply, as the need for marketability  of assets shifted acquisitions  toward public
issues. By the end of 1990, only one third of corporate  bond holdings of life companies were private
placement  issues.
Because  of their positive cash flow of investable  funds in the 1950s  and 1960s, life companies
had an added advantage over the public issue market--the use of  "forward commitments"  to deliver
borrowed funds at future dates.  Many borrowers needed to contract for new factory projects many
months or years in advance and to work out the necessary  financing at assured rates and terms.  Life
companies  were able to deliver loan proceeds  six months, twelve  months, and eighteen  months after the
loan agreement, if that suited the needs of the borrowers.  For example, if a new factory or a large
shopping  center was being built, the borrower would obtain interim  construction  financing  from a bank;
upon completion  of the project many  months  later, permanent  financing  from a life company  commitment
would pay off the construction  loan with a 25-year debenture.
In the early 1950s, life insurance companies owned over 60 percent of the corporate bonds
outstanding in the United States.  This percentage began to decline in subsequent years, however,
primarily because of the rapid growth of state and local government  retirement funds and noninsured
pension funds, which strongly favored corporate bonds  as an investment  outlet.  By the mid-1970s, the
share of outstanding  corporate bonds held by life companies  had declined  to about 33 percent, and that
share continued  to prevail in the late 1980s.
A major shift change of the past decade has been the new emphasis on public issues of debt
securities. Unlike private placements,  for which a secondary  market barely exists, public issues can be
resold from portfolio with much less difficulty.  This became an important consideration  for portfolio
managers after 1980, when liquidity gained higher priority for two reasons.  First, the industry had
experienced  a drastic liquidity  squeeze  in 1980-1981,  when policyholders  de,randed policy loans and/or
surrendered their policies to place the proceeds in marketable instruments with double-digit yields.
Second, the introduction  of interest- sensitive insuran-e products after 1980 led to greater uncertainty
about interruptions  of premium inflows  along with potential withdrawals,  leading companies  to adopt a
protective  stance with higher liquidity  ratios. In practice,  this brought about a new emphasis  on resalable
public issues along with a shortening  of original maturities from around 20 years to about half tha.
duration.
Investment  laws of the various  states  also influenced  the investment  by life companies  in corporate
debt obligations.  The most important  state on investment  matters has been New York, where many
companies wished to sell insurance  because of the large and prosperous population.  In order to sell
insurance  in New York State, it was necessary  to "comply  in substance' with New York investment  laws,
even if the company were domiciled in Ohio, Massachusetts,  Connecticut  or some other state.  Under
the New York  State investment  requirements  in force during most of the postwar  period, corporate  bonds
were required to pass several eligibility  tests.  Earnings  to service the debt must have been available  for
the past five years, and the issuer's net earnings  must equal at least 1-1/4  times the annual fixed charges.
16The eligible bond could not be in default as to principal  or interest, and the obligation  must have been
adequately  secured, with characteristics  wherein spec4lative  elements  were not predominant.  In addition
to these "qualitative"  restrictions  on life company  investments,  the states  have  normally imposed  a variety
of  "quantitative' limits based on percent of total assets and/or percent of capital and surplus, For
example, in New York, no more than 5 percent of insurance company assets could be invested in the
bonds of any one issuer, in order to ensure diversification  of holdings. Other states imposed  limits on
the percent of assets held in the bonds of railroads or public utilities, rather than corporate obligations
in general. Over the years, some of these limits have been liberalized  by many of the states. But when
New  York State in 1983  replaced  its lengthy  and detailed  "qualitative"  rules wit'i a more  general 'prudent
individual" rule,  it still retained most of  the "quantitative' limits to  ensure diversification of the
investment  portfolio.
In 1987, the New Yord insurance  ;-  ,'ment  became concerned  over the heavy investments  by
some insurers in so-called  junk bonds  sold in  .mection  with business  take- overs and leveraged  buyouts.
To limit company  exposure to such issues, New York imposed  a new limit of 20 percent of assets in
"high-yield  high-risk" obligations  publicly  traded or issued in a leveraged  buyout. This limit  was applied
more broadly in 1991 to include medium- grade bonds (rated Ba) and private placements  previously
outside  the limit. Within the 20 percent cap, "inside  limits" of 10 percent, 3 percent and 1 percent were
imposed  on lower grade bonds, effective in 1992.  Other states have introduced legislation  to impose
somewhat similar limits on bonds below investment  grade, in the effort to avoid insurer insolvencies
arising from the recent decline in junk bond prices.
Another form of regulatory influence  on the management  of corporate bond portfolios  has been
the Mandatory  Security Valuation  Reserve (MSVR)  which is required of companies  in all of the states.
The MSVR serves as a loss reserve to buffer company surplus against bond defaults and declines in
market values of corporate debt issues. The formula for company  contributions  to the MSVR is based
on the credit quality of each bond, which is reviewed every year by the Securities Valuation  Office of
the National Association  of Insurance Commissioners  (NAIC), a central organization  of all the state
insurance  departments. A minimal  contribution  of 1/10th  of one percent is required  against  higher-grade
bonds  (A-rated  or better), scaled  through the quality  grades to Caa or lower which must credit the MSVR
with 5 percent of the par value of such holdings. If a bond goes into default or is sold at a loss, such
losses  are charged  against  the MSVR  rather than surplus. In effect, the MSVR  system  serves to penalize
the acquisition  of lower-grade  corporate issues, by requiring transfers to the reserve at the expense of
current company  surplus.
It is important  to note that bondholdings  of life insurance  companies  are carried on their annual
statements  at stabilized  values, rather than current market values, unless an issue goes into default. This
rule, promulgated  by the NAIC many years ago, is based on the concept that bonds are normally held
to maturity  and should not be marked up or down each year according  to changes  in market interest  rates
that are beyond the control of the investing  company. Also, if assets are "marked  to miarket"  reflecting
interest rate swings, it is argued that liabilities should also be marked to market-leading to much
confusion  by policyholders  and regulators  alike.  Only  when a bond is sold or near default is the market
value recognized in the company accounts, reflecting the view that market value is appropriate  to a
liquidation  situation, not to going-concern  valuation.
17d.  Corporate  Equities
Common  and preferred stocks have never been a major investment  medium for life insurance
companies,  nor have the life companies  played a major role in the stock market. At the end of 1990, life
companies  held $119 billion in common  stock and $10 billion in preferred  stock, representing  9 per cent
of total industry  assets. Of thes,e  amouiits,  $59 billion was held in the general accounts  of life companies,
corresponding  to 4.7 percent of general account assets.  Another $69 billion of common and preferred
shares was held in the segregated  accounts  established  separately  for pension  customers  who bear the risk
of market fluctuations. Only 3 percent of the outstaneing  common  stock of U.S. corporations  is currently
owned by life insurance  companies.
The reason for this modest interest in common  stock arises in large part from the general view
that stocks are a riskier investment  medium, often with speculative  elements not appropriate for life
insurance companies. Indeed, the influential New York investment  laws prohibited the acquisition  of
common stock until 1951, when up to 3 percent of company assets was authorized as a maximum.
(Several  other states  had more liberal  ceilings  for common  stock, often as high as 10  percent at that time.)
The New York limit was raised to 5 percent of assets in 1957 and further increased  to  10 percent in
1969. Other quantitative  limits applied as well; in 1951, a life company  could not acquire more than 2
percent of the outstanding  shares of any single corporation  (raised  to 5 percent in 1969). Also, only 0.2
percent of assets could be invested in a single corporation in 1951 (raised in a series of changes to 2
percent at present). The current limit on total holdings  of common  shares is 20 percent of assets under
New York law.
These tight investment  limits created problems for life companies in meeting the demands of
pension customers,  who wished to share in the substantial  market appreciation  of common  stock during
the 1950s. These customers  turned to the trust departments  of commercial  banks to handle their pension
monPys,  with instructions  to place major proportions in the rising stock market. In order to compete  for
such funds, life insurance  companies  sought to establish "separate  accounts"  outside  the general account
of the company itself and, most importantly, without the quantitative  limits imposed  on companies by
state investment  laws.  Beginning  in 1959, the state laws were rewritten to permit separate accounts  to
hold as much as 100 percent in common  stock if the customer so desired.  However, any gain or loss
(realized  or unrealized)  on such accounts  was credited  or charged  to the customer, and not to the general
account of the life company.
At first, separate  accounts  were solely  for group  pension  plans, but state laws later permitted  their
use for both group and individual  contracts, including  variable annuities  and variable life policies.  At
year-end 1990, separate accounts held $160 billion in assets, about 11 percent of total industry assets;
less than half of this amount is presently  in common  stock, with the remainder  in bonds, mortgages,  real
estate and other invested  assets.
In contrast to the stabilized statement values of corporate bonds, common stock held in the
general accounts of life companies is carried at market value.  Thus, fluctuations  in stock prices can
produce large gains or losses  for life company  financial  statements,  introducing  an element  of risk which
many companies  avoid by owning  little or no stock.  Downturns in stock prices can produce incursions
into capital and surplus, and this took place for many  companies  in the 1973-74  period, when stock prices
lost 45 percent of their previous peak  values  before rebounding  in 1975-76. Volatility  of this type is still
an unwelcome  feature in the portfolio  policies  of many life companies,  even though long-run  gains may
outstrip  the earnings  on corporate bonds.
18The MSVR  described  above  for bonds is also used to cushion  the fluctuations  of common  stock,
though in a somewhat  different  fashion. Life companies  are required  to place the realized  and unrealized
gains from common  stock holdings  into  the MSVR  until the reserve  reaches  a maximum  of 33-1/3 percent
of holdings; thereafter, gains may be credited to company  surplus. Conversely,  any losses on common
stock are first taken against the MSVR and when that reserve is exhausted, charges are made against
company  surplus.  In this way, the surplus account is cushioned  against a large share of fluctuations  in
stock prices.
e.  E'  mmercial  Real Estate Mortagaes
Because  mortgage  loans traditionally  have  had maturities  of 20, 25 or 30 years, they have always
been viewed as an ideal investment  medium  for the long-term  obligations  of whole-life  policy reserves.
At the end of 1990,  mortgage  holdings  were $268 billion  or 19 percent of total industry  assets. The bulk
of such holdings (about $200 billion) was in the form of mortgages  on commercial  real estate such as
office buildings,  shopping  centers, industrial warehouses,  hospitals, hotels and resort properties. Other
mortgage operations  include loans on apartment  dwellings,  single-family  homes, and farm properties.
For the first 25 years after World War 11,  life insurance  companies  held first place as the largest
institutional  lender on commercial  properties, and they have continued  to provide between 25 and 30
percent of commercial  real estate financing  in the United States. In the 1950s, lending  to finance retail
stores and new shopping centers was the main thrust of life company activity, providing the support
services  for new community  development  based on the sharp upturn in homebuilding. The focus shifted
toward office buildings  in the late 1960s  and early 1970s,  but retail store financing  again has become  the
largest single form of commercial  mortgage lending  by life companies  in recent years.
State  investment  laws  governing  mortgage  lending  by life companies  have  followed  a conservative
course, limiting  mortgage  loans on commercial  properties  to 66-2/3 percent of appraised  value until 1964
when New York State raised the permitted loan-to-value  ratio to 75 percent.  Many states impose
quantitative  limits on total mortgage  loans held by life companies;  the percentage  in New York was 40
percent until it was lifted  to 50 percent of assets in 1964. More common  was the legal limit on lending
on any single  parcel, usually  2 percent of assets  but sometimes  a percentage  related to capital and surplus.
Such restrictions apply to any form of mortgage lending, and not just to commercial  mortgages.  The
current New York limit stands at 2 percent of assets on a single  property, but other states are sometimes
higher.
Commitments  on commercial  mortgages  are usually  made in advance  of construction,  with funds
paid in installments  as the work is completed,  and proceeds  used to repay short- term construction  loans
from commercial  banks.  Loan maturities normally ran in the 20- to 25-year range until recent years,
when liquidity  considerations  led life companies  to limit the bulk of their commercial  mortgage lending
to 10-year  maturities.
f.  Residential Mortgage Lending
In the years immediately  following  World War II, life companies  became  important  lenders on
home mortgages, financing a large share of the postwar boom in housing construction. The primary
outlets were mortgages  insured  by the Federal Housing  Administration  (FHA) or loans  guaranteed  by the
Veterans Administration  (VA).  Along with the safety of government  backing, these loans commanded
attractive  yields  for the time. Conventional  home  loans, i.e., those without  government  guarantees, were
19also made in vo!unme  to finance apartment  houses  as well as single-family  homes. By the mid-1960s,  the
life insurance  industry  held 15 percent of the outstanding  mortgage loans  on residential  properties in the
United States.
Under state investment  laws, the maximum  66-2/3 loan-to-value  ratio on mortgage loans was
waived  for FHA and VA mortgages,  thus allowing  life companies  to operate in those markets along  with
other institutions. But the limit hampered activity in conventional  home loans until 1959, when New
York and other states lifted the loan-to-value  ratio to 75 percent, but only on home loans amortLed in
30 years or less, in amounts  of $30.000 or less.  Not until 1974  was the maximum  lifted to 90 percent
of appraised  value, to keep life companies  in step with other institutional  lenders.
In the late 1960s  and 1970s, however, investment  yields on corporate securities became more
attractive  than for home loans, and life companies  moved away from the single-  famil'  mortgage field
which was being supplied  by the depository  thrift institutions  that specialized  in home mortgage  lending.
Consequently,  the current holdings of home mortgages  by life insurance  companies  are quite small and
only a few companies  are still active in making  home loans.
In the late 1970s,  however, life companies  re-entered  the home mortgage  market in an indirect
fashion--purchases  of "mortgage-backed  securities" which had been developed  as a new capital market
instrument.  Under this arrangement, a mortgage  originator such as a savings and loan association or
commercial  bank packages  a large number  of home loans into a portfolio  which is "securitized"  and sold
to other investors such as life companies. Interest and amortization  from the underlying  mortgages is
passed through monthly to the owner of the mortgage-backed  security, including  any prepayments. In
addition, such quasi-governmental  agencies  as the Government  National  Mortgage  Association  (GNMA),
the Federal National Mortgage  Association  (FNMA)  and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage  Corporation
(FHLMC) purchase large amounts  of mortgages  in the secondary  market in order to repackage  them as
mortgage-backed  securities  to be sold to various investor  groups.
Holdings  of various  types of mortgage-backed  securities  by life insurance  companies  have grown
rapidly, currently  exceeding  $159  billion. In this way, life company  investment  finds continue  to finance
the construction  of single-family  homes.
g.  U.S. Treasury Securities and Federal Agency  Issues
At the end of 1990,  life insurance  companies  held $59 billion  in direct and guaranteed  obligations
of the U.S.  Treasury and $121 billion in  issues of various federal agencies. Taken together, these
holdings represented 13 percent of total industry assets.  While these securities are of the highest
investment quality-superior to any corporate issue- -they carry the lowest .nterest rates within life
company  portfolios.
Life company  attraction to Treasury and agency issues has developed only in the past several
years.  In the mid-1970s, such holdings were 3 percent or less of total assets, as the higher yields on
corporate issues  and mortgages  attracted  the bulk of available  funds. The recent interest in Treasury  and
agency  issues is explained  by two factors. First is the need  to hold a larger share of absolutely  safe assets
to counterbalance  the riskier, high-yield bonds and mortgages that were acquired in the 1980s. The
second  factor is the need for greater liquidity,  to match  the potential  for withdrawals  and surrenders  from
the  new  product lines of  interest-sensitive policies.  In  ccntrast to  the  traditional holdings of
private-placement  bonds and commercial  mortgage  loans for which there is ne organized  resale market,
20Treasury and agency securities are highly liquid, resalable in a broad secondary market where large
quantities  can be liquidated  without  depressing  prices.  Moreover,  Treasuries can be bought with much
shorter maturities  so that the interest-rate  risk of volatile  market prices is minimized.
Because  they are recognized  as the safest investments  in the marketplace,  Treasury and agency
issues have never been restricted in state investment  laws, nor have security reserves been required
against such holdings under the MSVR  rules outlined above. It is noteworthy,  moreover, that purchase
of Treasury  securities by life insurance  companies  has never been mandated  in the United States, either
by state law or by the federal government.
h.  State and Local Government Securities
In the United States, interest income from obligations  of state and local governments  and the
agencies  authorized  by these political  units is not subject  to federal  income  taxes. Since  these  tax-exempt
issues  are highly attractive  to investors  in the higher tax-rate  brackets,  borrowing costs of state and local
governments  are kept lower than for other issuers  whose interest payments  are taxable to the recipient,
usually running around two percentage  points lower for bonds  of comparable  quality ratings.
Life insurance  companies  as a general rule have had little attraction to the tax-exempt  issues of
state an. local government  units, primarily  because  of the way in which life companies  themselves  have
been taxed over the years.  At the end of 1990, life companies held less than $10 billion in such
obligations,  equal to less than one percent of total assets.
i.  Investment Real Estate
Through their role as lenders on commercial  real estate, life companies  became more familiar
with the operational  and management  aspects of such properties and decided to make direct real estat,
investments  in addition  to mortgage  loans. As direct owners, they stood  to benefit  from increased  market
value of an office building  or shopping  center, as opposed  to being  fixed-rate  lenders  to developers  who
reaped the profits from later appreciation  in property values. Accordingly,  a number  of the larger life
companies  became  active  as developers,  managers  and owners  of many types of real property. In recent
years, real estate holdings  have amounted  to more than 3 percent of total assets, for a dollar total of $45
billion at the end of 1990. About one eighth of this amount represents  the value of insurance  company
head offices and branches used for their own operations.
Investment  laws limit the ownership  of real estate, as with other invested  assets.  Under New
York law, a company  cannot own more than 2 percent of assets in any particular  property, or more than
20 percent of assets in real estate held for investment  purposes;  however, up to 10 percent of assets can
be devoted to company-used  properties  so long as total real estate holdings  do not exceed 25 percent.
j.  Foreign Investments
Investments in obligations or equities issued by foreign governments or nationals have been
severely limited  by state investment  laws for many years, presumably  because of the risks of exchange
fluctuations, expropriations, or  wars in addition to the difficulties of monitoring such investments.
However, a number of larger companies  have engaged in lending abroad, though in relatively minor
amounts.
21At the endl  of 1990, the life insurance  industry held $27 billion in foreign corporate bonds, $5
million in foreign commercial paper, and $17 billion in obligations of foreign governments and
international  agencies. Taken together,  these  holdings  represent  about 3.5 percent of total industry  assets.
Although breakdowns are not available, a large share of these amounts is known to be invested in
Canada, where U.S. life companies  are often licensed  to sell insurance  and annuities  and are required to
invest  part of their conset;uent  reserves.
Canadian investments  are favored under investment  limits of many states.  New York State
permits  up to 10 percent  of assets  in Canadian  investments  of all kinds, while investments  in other foreign
countries are subject to an overall limit of 3 percent of assets with no more than 1 percent in a single
country.
k.  Policy Loans
While loans to  policyholde.s are earning assets of  life insurance companies  they are not
considered investments  in the strict sense.  Rather, they represent borrowings  on the cash value of a
policy, made at the request of the policyholder  and carrying a specified interest charge.  At the end of
1990, policy loans represented  4.3 percent of total industry  assets, for a total of $62 billion.
The basis of policy loans arises from the life insurance  contract for whole-life  policies which,
under the mandate  of state insurance  laws, allows  the policyholder  to borrow up to a high percentage  of
his cash value. The interest rate for such laws is also specified  in the contract, with such rates fixed at
either 5 percent or 6 percent in policies issued  before the early 1970s. When market interest rates rose
well above these levels, it bt.came advantageous  for policyholders  to  access their policies at these
favorable rates, either as an alternative  to borrowing elsewhere or to reinvest the loan proceeds in
higher-yielding  market securities.
One result of these provisions  was repeated  drains on life company  investable  funds, whenever
market rates rose above  the fixed  policy loan rates. Such withdrawals  thereby precluded  the companies
from using such funds for investment  in bonds and mortgages at the higher prevailing yields, thus
reducing overall investment  returns.  For some companies, sudden  drains from policy loans interfered
with their ability to honor forward commitmeaits  to take down private placements  and mortgage loans
scheduled in advance.  To correct this situation, the industry  persuaded insurance regulators  to permit
a flexible  system of policy loan interest rates, linked to a moving index  of bond yields  rather than fixed
contractual  rates. This allowed  the policyholder  to obtain  funds if needed,  but prevented  interest  arbitrage
for such borrowings  when market yields surged  to higher levels.
1.  Rate of Net Investment  Income
The earnings  rate on life company  assets reflects the interest rates trends in the capital markets,
but with a time lag because  the bulk of such assets  represent  longer-term  investments  acquired  in previous
years.  In 1980, the rate of net investment  income  for the industry stood at 8.02 percent; by 1985  this
figure had risen to a peak of 9.63 percent, reflecting  the high rate level on new investments  made in the
intervening  years. Over the next five years, however,  the earnings  rate declined  steadily, falling to 8.89
percent in 1990. This rate refers to investment  income  aftei investment  expenses  and depreciation,  but
before federal income taxes; it excludes  capital  gains and losses.
22The rate on general accounts  typically  runs higher  than for separate  accounts, largely  because  the
latter has a high proportion of common stock paying lower current dividends (but with a substantial
potential  for capita' gains excluded  from the calculation). In 1985,  the general account  earnings  rate was
9.87 percent, declining  to 9.31 percent in 1990. Because  industry  assets  are largely invested  in corporate
debt obligations and commercial  real estate mortgages,  these earnings rates run higher than the rates
available  on U.S. government  bonds, but they obviously  involve a higher risk element  than on Treasury
and agency  security issues.
23V.  REGULATION
a.  Overview of Regulatory System by State Governments
In the United States, regulation  of insurance  companies  is reserved to the several states, rather
than the federal government. The origins of this system date back to the early 1800s when insurance
companies  were first coming into existence;  the first supervisory  boards were established in the New
England  states  in the 1  850s. New York State  was the first to appoint  a full-time  insurance  commissioner,
in 1859. By 1871, state insurance  regulation  had evolved  to the point that an organization  was formed
of insurance supervisors of the several states, now known as the National Association  of Insurance
Commissioners  (NAIC),  to promote  and encourage  uniformity  in laws and regulations  affecting  insurance.
For several decades, according to court rulings, the sale of insurance was considered "not a
transaction  of commerce" and therefore outside  the powers of the federal government  in its regulation
of interstate  commerce. In 1944, a Supreme  Court ruling  stated tihat  insurance  sold across state lines was
interstate  commerce and subject to a variety of federal statutes; however, a federal law (known as the
McLarran-Ferguson  Act) was passed the following year which assured the existing state powers to
regulate insurance, rather than allowing  federal government  agencies  to take on regulatory  powers over
insurance. That law remains  in force to the present time.
The primary objective  of insurance  regulation  and supervision is to protect the interests of the
insurance buying public.  This  responsibility is carried out in two ways: first,  to  determine that
policyholders  and beneficiaries  are given fair and reasonable  treatment by insurers and insurance  agents;
and second, to ensure the financial  soundness  of insurance  carriers and the capital, reserves and invested
assets held for the distribution  of benefits. The following  sections  spell out in some detail the means  by
which state insurance  regulators  seek to meet their objectives.
b.  Organization of State Insurance Departments
Insurance  departments  of the 50 states and the District of Columbia  are organized as agencies
within the executive  branch of state government, with powers and duties normally specified under the
insurance code passed by the state legislature.  Such departments are headed by a superintendent  or
commissioner  of insurance who is usually appointed by the governor of the state; in twelve states,
however,  this official  is elected  by state voters. The commissioner  is typically  given power to make rules
and regulations  to carry out provisions of the insurance code, often with quasi-judicial  powers to hold
hearings  on insurance  matters.
Funding for insurance  departments  is usually provided  from the general revenues  of the states,
as appropriated  annually  by state legislatures  for operations  of the executive branch. Such moneys are
used to engage professional  staff such as lawyers, actuaries, and financial examiners  to carry out the
assigned  duties  of the department. The size of departmental  staff varies widely  among  states, depending
on the number  of insurance  companies  for which the state has responsibility  and the size and complexity
of such companies. Hence,  the staff size  varies from about 100 in some  smaller states  to several thousand
in New York State.
24c.  Chartering  and  Licensine of Comlanies ant Ag.n
A primary power  of insurance  departments  is the chartering  of insurance  companies  incorporated
in their respective  states as "domestic  insurers." The code typically  specifies the minimum  capital and
surplus needed by a stock company  and the minimum  surplus required of a mutual company.  The most
striuigent  requirement, in New York State, calls for $1 million  ir. capital stock and $2 million  in surplus
for a total of S3 million. Standards  for forming a mutual company  in New York are equally stringent
and no new mutual insurers  have  been incorporated  there for several decades. In other states, chartering
standards are not as stiff; initial capital can be as low as $350,000 in some western states so that the
number  of new incorporations  is considerably  higher. The insurance  codes often require  that organizing
directors and officers be of good character  with proven business capabilities. The charter then issued
often specifies which classes of insurance  may be underwritten  by the company,  and which lines (such
as health insurance  or casualty insurance)  may only be written through a subsidiary.
In addition  to chartering, insurance  departments  are charged  with the licensing  of insurers, both
domestic and out-of-state companies,  with renewals  of such licenses  subject to compliance  with a wide
range of state standards, including  filing of annual financial  statements,  observance  of investment  laws,
etc. Without such licenses,  companies  from other states (called  foreign insurers)  are not permitted  to sell
policies to state residents, except for mail-order  insurance  which many states now permit.  In this way,
each state is able to exercise a strong degree of control over the operations  both of domestic companies
and of out-of-state  and alien companies  admitted  to do business  in the state.
A related  control element  arises from licensing  of insurance  agents  and brokers, which is usually
specified by insurance law.  To obtain a license, the applicant  must show that he has been certified  by
an insurance  company  as to his honesty and competence,  and he must pass whatever  tests of competency
are required by the insurance commissioner. The license may be revoked or suspended  if the agent
willfully violates insurance regulations, or conducts fraudulent practices, or  is proved incompetent.
Licenses are usually perpetual, but sometimes renewal fees are required.  Separate licensing is often
required for sales of health insurance,  a product  line carried by many life insurance  companies. If the
agent wishes  to sell variable  annuities  or variable  life (investment  products  regulated  by the Securities  and
Exchange Commission), he  must  also  obtain a  special  federal license upon passing prescribed
examinations.  Some states also issue limited licenses  which permit only the sale of credit life insurance.
d.  Approval of Contract Forms
A key element  of consumer  protection  by state regulators is the control over authorized  contract
forms for policies sold to residents of the state.  As new versions of life insurance and annuities are
developed  within companies,  the policy  provisions  must receive  the commissioner's  approval  before  they
can be offered to the public.  Regulatory  review is designed to exclude ambiguous  language and to
prevent unfair or deceptive practices, in the effort to protect policyholders and beneficiaries.  The
commissioner  usually  is empowered  to disapprove  policy  forms that are contrary  to any provision  of state
laws or regulations, or are deemed to be unfair, inequitable  or misleading  to the policyholder.
Standard  policy  provisions  required  under the insurance  laws of most states  commonly  deal with
such matters as grace periods for premium  payment;  incontestability;  nonforfeiture  benefits  and surrender
values; policy loans after three years; and a variety of other legal rights.  Where  group life insurance  is
involved, state laws also require the policy to provide for conversion privileges on termination of
employment  or on termination  of the master policy.
25e.  Jife  Premiums  and Policy Reserves
Premiums on life insurance  policies are not directly regulated  by the state authorities, but the
regulation of reserve liabilities  provides an indirect regulation  of premiums charged to the consumer.
States typically  prescribe the basis for calculating  minimum  reserves, in terms of mortality  tables to be
utilized, maximum  interest rate assumptions,  and the valuation  method  to be used.  Regulation  is aimed
primarily at the adequacy  of reserves, and companies  are allowed to adjust their reserve calculation  to
provide  higher reserves, so long as the minimum  reserve standards are satisfied.
Statutory  requirements  for reserve calculations,  along with statutory limits on commissions  and
expenses  on new policies, are generally seen as ensuring that adequate  premiums are charged, while it
is felt that competition  among  companies  provides  a safeguard  against  excessive  premium  rates. The net
cost of insurance  is also dependent  on the level of policy dividends  paid on participating  policies of stock
companies  and on all policies of mutual insurance  companies. Such dividends  are paid to policyholders
when investment  income  and mortality  experience  generate  an excess  in company  earnings;  to ensure such
payouts, some states  have surplus  limitation  laws designed  to prevent  the accumulation  of excess earnings
by the company  beyond certain levels.
To assist consumers in comparing costs of similar policies offered by different life insurance
companies, many states require that buyers be furnished with indexes showing  the surrender value of
different policies at a future date and the death benefit payable at an assumed point in time.  These
interest-adjusted  cost comparison data have been distributed in  "buyers' guides" for life insurance
products since the mid-1970s, but there continues to  be concern about the adequacy of  consumer
information  for the average buyer.
In-urers are allowed, within limits, to classify  policy applicants  by risk and to charge different
premiums  accordingly.  The age of the applicant  is an obvious  variant which requires a higher premium
at higher ages because  of life expectancies.  Since  women have longer life expectancies  on average, rates
charged  to them are typically lower than for men, though at least one state (Montana)  requires unisex
rates to avoid  such discrimination. Many states permit lower rates for non-smokers.  Those in high-risk
occupations or  with risky avocations such as  airplane piloting can be  charged higher premiums.
Applicants  with known  health problems  can be required  to pay higher  premiums  by reason of known risk
factors. Also, policies  in some states  can contain  a war-risk  clause, waiving  death benefits  if death results
from war, since life expectancies  cannot be factored in to mortality  calculations  in such an event.
On the other hand, many  states prohibit  risk classification  arising  from race, religion or national
origin.  A current controversy  relates to an insurer's right to test applicants  for the AIDS virus, which
many companies insist upon to protect against adverse selection  by those who foresee imminent  death
from that disease.
f.  Regulation of Investments
Illustrations  of the investment  laws governing  life insurance  companies have been given in the
earlier section  on company  activities  in the capital  market, but a few general  observations  may be in order
at this point.
The general philosophy  behind the state investment  laws is that insurers must remain in sound
financial  condition, to protect the interests  of the insurance  buying public.  Toward this end, safety of
26principal is the foremost consideration;  undue risk is to be avoided, even though this implies a sacrifice
of potential  investment  earnings  that could be realized  from assets involving  greater risk.
To minimize risk, investment  laws in some states set forth a number of prohibited  investments;
other states use specific  lists of permitted  investments. Diversification  of asset types is another common
requirement,  not by requiring certain asset shares in particular forms, but by limiting the percentage  of
assets held in certain forms, e.g., mortgage  loans, or common  stocks, or bonds of a single issuer. Such
percentage  restrictions  are termed "quantitative  limits" and are widely  used in the investment  laws of most
states.
Another type of restriction is through "qualitative  limits" related to the quality of the eligible
investment. For example, the earnings of a corporate bond issuer must equal a certain ratio to the
interest charges  on outvtanding  debt; or the mortgage  on real estate cannot  exceed a specified percentage
of appraised  value; or', the common  stock must be traded on a national  exchange  with a record of paying
dividends  for the previous three years.
In practice, the quantitative  and qualitative  limits on investments  prevented life companies  from
going into new investment  forms which emerged during the postwar years, since they were not on the
permitted  list.  To provide  for some relief from these constraints,  and to leave room for innovation  and
flexibility, several states including New York approved "leeway clauses" in their investment  laws,
permitting  a certain percent of assets to be invested in forms not otherwise  specified. The initial percent
in New York was 2 percent of assets in 1958, raised in later years to 5 percent and then to 10 percent
at present. The use of "leeway  clauses"  allowed  companies  to enter such new fields  as equipment  leasing,
oil and gas pipeline  finance, and a variety of novel financing  techniques. It also allowed companies  to
exceed normal quality limits, such as the 75 percent loan-to-value  ratio on commercial  mortgages, by
"spilling  over" any excess into the leeway  category.
As noted  earlier, the specific  requirements  and limits in state investment  laws vary widely  among
the several states, and cannot be easily summarized.  However, the importance  of New York State
investment  laws (frequently  cited in this paper) has been a major factor for most companies, since the
companies  licensed  in New  York are required  to "comply  in substance"  with these  laws, even  though  they
may be domiciled in other states.  It has been estimated  that companies  doing business in New York
State, and subject to these laws, account for 70 percent of total sales of life insurance throughout  the
United States.
After several decades  of imposing  the most restrictive  investment  standards  of any state, the New
York legislature in 1983 made a major change in its investment  statutes.  In place of highly detailed
quality tests and eligibility  standards, often running on for many pages for each type of investment,  the
new legislation  substituted  a broad standard  generally known  as the "prudent  man" rule.  The amended
law stated that life company investments  should be made "with that degree of care that an ordinarily
prudent  individual  in a like position  would  use under similar  circumstances."  It should be noted, however,
that most of the quantitative  limits on percentages  of assets, contained  in another  section  of the New York
State law, remained  in force.
g.  Submission of Financial  Statements
The financial condition  of life insurance companies  is reviewed by state regulators in a variety
of ways, but the primary document  is the annual statement  to be filed with the insurance  department  of
27every state in which the company  does business. The format  of such statements,  known  as the convention
blank, is universal  within all states under rules developed  by the NAIC to provide uniformity.
The convention  blank resembles  the usual corporate  financial  statement in some respects, but is
designed  primarily to describe operations peculiar to insurance companies. The balance sheet shows
assets and liabilities;  a "summary  of operations"  is similar  to an income statement. The surplus account
shows sources of funds from amounts  carried over from the previous year, net gains from operations,
and net capital gains; uses of funds are dividends  to stockholders,  increases in surplus, and net capital
losses.  Further exhibits show the contributions to surplus from each of the main insurance lines
(ordinary, group, health, credit); the reserve section shows additions to reserves from assumed net
premiums and interest, from which assumed mortality, termination payments  and other costs are then
subtracted  to show reserves at year-end.
Among the several other exhibits detailing company  operations are the lengthy schedules for
company  investments,  listing  every asset acquired  in the year and every  bond, stock, mortgage,  etc. held
at year-end.  Other schedules  show the compensation  paid to company officers and employees above
certain amounts, and a report of proceedings  of the latest annual meeting  of the company.
To guard against  fraud or concealment,  state regulators  in recent years have begun to require that
such financial  statements  be reviewed  by independent  auditing  firms and certified  as to their completeness
and correctness. Many mutual companies,  in addition  to the statutory  accounting  required  by the states,
have begun to  have their financial statements recast according to  Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles  (GAAP)  in keeping  with most other corporations  in the business  community.  It may be noted
that stock companies, in accordance with SEC requirements, file GAAP financial statements both
quarterly and annually with the federal authorities.
In the schedules  relating to invested  assets, the current valuation  of bonds, preferred stock and
common  stock is determined  by the Securities  Valuation  Office (SVO) of the NAIC in order to record
standardized  values  for all companies,  for use in financial  statements  submitted  to each state. In this way,
a particular bond issue held by several companies  is carried at the identical  statement value in each of
their annual statements.  This procedure is particularly  necessary  for private placement  bonds, for which
current market price quotations  are not available. The role of the SVO is to review each security  as to
its credit standing,  to determine  whether  it may be carried at amortized  value or marked down  to a lower
statement  value because of actual or imminent  default.  For public bond issues for which independent
credit ratings are available, the SVO can determine  whether amortized  values can be used in company
statements; current market quotations  are available  for most common  stocks.
This procedure for determining  credit ratings and values  for securities held by life companies  is
necessary not only for providing standardized values for statement purposes, but also to determine
required contributions  to the MSVR. As described  earlier, bonds in the lower quality  grades are required
to contribute  larger amounts  to the MSVR than bonds in the higher grades, and the SVO classifications
provide the necessary  gradings for company  use on a uniform  basis.
h.  SQlvency  MomQdnifg
In the interests  of protecting  consumers  who  purchase  life insurance  and annuities, the regulators
recognize  that financial  soundness  of individual  companies  must be maintained,  to assure  their capability
to pay benefits and claims to the public.  Perhaps the first line of defense  of company solvency  lies in
28the state laws and regulations  dealing  with capital and surplus requirements,  liabilities  and reserves, and
limits on permitted  investments-all  of which are designed  to maintain  a safe and sound  financial  condition
among companies.
A second  line of defense  is the regulatory  procedures  for reviewing  financial  statements  filed with
each state and the financial  examination  of the company's  accounts. As a general  practice, each company
is examined  by the state regulators every third year, unless there are indications  of difficulties which
warrant  more frequent  attention. Priority is assigned  to problem  companies,  based on review  of financial
statements, history of deteriorating financial  condition, change of management  control, or information
from outside sources that difficulties  have arisen.  While many states reserve the right to examine any
insurance  company  licensed in their state, financial  examinations  are usually conducted  only by the state
of domicile.
A key element in solvency  surveillance  and identification  of troubled companies  is provided  by
the Central Office of the NAIC, which developed  an Insurance  Regulatory Information  Service (IRIS)
several years ago to monitor  potential insolvency  situations. Annual  statements  filed with the NAIC are
used to compile 12 financial ratios thought  to indicate impending  financial  difficulties (see Appendix).
If a company  has four or more ratios outside  the usual range, further analysis is undertaken in greater
depth  and regulators  in the state of domicile  are notified  of the need for further review. The system has
been useful in identifying  a number  of troubled companies  in recent years, but there have been doubts
within  the industry as to whether  they have  the same predictive  value for large companies  that they seem
to have for smaller insurers. Further refinements  in the ratios and the review  process are now in process
by the NAIC.  Since financial examinations  by state regulators normally are conducted  on a triennial
basis, the IRIS  system allows for more timely means  to correct troubled  situatio;s among  life companies.
WVhen  an insurer is found to be in serious  financial  difficulties,  or is actually  insolvent,  the state
insurance  department  is required to assume  control  over the company's  assets and management. A court
order is obtained  to appoint  the regulator  as receiver  for the purpose  of rehabilitating  the company, if that
can be accomplished,  or liquidating  the company  if it is insolvent. The NAIC has developed  model  laws
for such procedures  and these have been adopted by most states. In the distribution of assets provided
by these laws, highest priority is given to costs of administration,  employee  salaries, and policyholder
claims.
Insolvencies  among  U.S. life insurance  companies  have been  on the rise over the past few years.
Before 1987, insolvencies  numbered 10 or less and involved  smaller companies  with assets below $50
million.  In 1989 there were 40 insolvencies,  including an insurer with $646 million in assets. A task
force of the ACLI that undertook  a special study of the insolvencies  during the 1985-1990  period focused
on 68 cases, finding the causes to  include affiliate transactions (often involving fraud) in 47 cases,
problems in accident and health insurance lines in 41 cases, underpricing of products in 40 cases,
investment  problems  (often real estate) in 31 cases, and problems  with new management  in 25 cases. The
identified  causes were, of course, often interrelated.
A series of insolvencies  of major  life insurance  companies  surfaced in 1991, leading  to wide scale
public attention and calls for reform in regulatory standards.  The first of these insolvencies was
Executive Life of California (a $13 billion company)  followed by its affiliate, Executive Life of New
York (a $3 billion company). Soon after, a $4 billion company  in California named First Capital  Life
was taken over by the state inskurance  department, as was its $4 billion affiliate called Fidelity Bankers
Life in Virginia; both units were shut down to halt the surge in policyholder  withdrawals  of policy funds.
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billion company) in July 1991, when solvency  was threatened mainly by the withdrawal of pension
money. A $4 billion company,  Monarch  Life in Massachusetts,  was taken  over by the state commissioner
when its parent company  had problems  that threatened its solvency  status.
The insolvencies  of 1991, involving  much larger companies,  were directly related  to investment
problems  arising from (a) over-investment  in high-risk "junk bonds' which have fallen sharply in price,
and (b) defaults  on commercial  real estate mortgage loans, leading to sizeable  book losses. Regulators
took charge  of the affected companies  in large part to halt mounting  withdrawals  of policyholder  funds
which developed  after the deterioration  of tOese  companies'  asset base became  widely known.
i.  State Insurance Guaranty Funds
State  guaranty  associations  have  been established  in every  state (but not the District  of Columbia)
to satisfy benefit  claims  of policyholders  and annuitants,  in the event  that an insurance  company  liquidated
through insolvency does not possess sufficient assets.  The deficiency is met by assessments  on all
companies  licensed  in the state of the liquidated  insurer. While provisions  of these guaranty  funds are not
uniform, typical covurage  is $300,000 in death benefits, $100,000 in cash or withdrawal  value for life
insurance,  and $100,000 in present  value of annuity  benefits. Some states  also provide  varying  coverage
for unallocated annuity contracts  purchased by employers  to fund pension plans, usually limited to $5
million for any one contract holder.
Most guaranty funds limit protection  to residents of their own state, regardless of where the
insolvent  insurer is domiciled. Other states cover all policyholders  of an insolvent  domiciled  company,
regardless  of the residence  of claimants.  Assessments  on the companies  is made  after the fact, rather than
through  pre-funding,  as is the case in federal deposit insurance  for banking  and thrift institutions. Based
on the amount  of direct premiums  received  in the state during the previous year, assessments  are limited
to 2 percent of such premiums  in a given year.  Such assessments  may be offset against the payment of
state premium  taxes that are levied annually  on insurers;  thus, the major burden of such assessments  falls
on state revenues  and hence on taxpayers in the states.
j.  Role of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners in Insurance Regulation
Passing reference  frequently  has been made to the NAIC and its involvement  in a wide range of
regulatory matters. This body was created  by insurance  commissioners  of the several states in 1871 as
a common  ground for finding  solutions  to mutual problems. The objectives  of this body are to promote
uniformity in insurance  laws and regulations  among  the states, by developing "model  laws"; to improve
the quality and effectiveness  of insurance  departments  in their administration  of laws and regulations;  and
to protect the interests of the insurance  public.
A Central Office has been established  by the NAIC with a sizeable  full-time  staff, in addition  to
the Securities Valuation Office which reviews the quality standing of bonds and stocks carried in the
annual reports of life companies.  Meetings  of all commissioners  are held twice yearly, plus interim
meetings  of the many standing committees  charged  with developing  model regulations  and laws as well
as other policy guidelines. Financing of these activities is primarily from user fees charged to life
companies, rather than from contributions  from state insurance  departments.
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almost every aspect of insurance  operations. Such models are not binding  cn the states, but they have
been widely  accepted  and have  brought about  a large measure  of uniformity  among  states  in the regulation
of life companies. In addition, the NAIC  activities  have precluded  much  duplication  of effort among  the
states and among the regulated  life companies;  use of a uniform  format for annual statements  is but one
example.
Because of its continuing  influence  and growing prestige, the NAIC has become the principal
rule-making  body for insurance  regulation  within  the United  States. Model  laws are developed  only after
lengthy hearings involving both regulatory and industry viewpoints along with technical input from
departmental  staff. With some modifications,  such models  have been widely  adopted  by state legislatures
within two or three years of promulgation  by the NAIC.  In brief, the NAIC has provided  a forum for
orderly and reasoned consideration  of the evolving standards  of insurance regulation  affecting  the vast
majority  of life insurance companies.
At the same time, it should be noted, there have been repeated efforts on the part of federal
legislators to develop a federal government  presence in the regulation  of insurance, by preempting  the
role of the states or by imposing  minimum  federal standards of insurance regulation  which the several
states would be required to follow.  One approach has been to provide optional federal chartering  of
insurance companies, allowing individual  companies to choose between state and federal regulation.
O*ther  approaches  would take over certain aspects of company  regulation, leaving other matters to the
states.  Such proposals have been prompted  in recent months by the rash of insurer insolvencies  which
have occurred under the state regulatory  system.
k.  Consumer Protection
Although reference  to protection  of consumer  interests  has been made at several points above,
a brief recapitulation  of such measures may be in order.  The insurance  buying public is first protected
by regulators  which review policy contracts  to see that they are understandable,  fair to the buyer, and
consistent  with policyholder  rights set forth in the law.  Agents must be licensed by the state, and their
commissions  are governed in large part by state laws.  Regulations  also define certain elements of the
sales illustrations  they use to show the costs of the policy, and the states often publish buyers' guides to
allow consumers to compare insurance costs among companies.  Insurance departments  periodically
review the market conduct  of companies  in their states, to be sure that agents are treating  policyholders
fairly and in conformance  with the laws.  A few states provide a service to prospective buyers of
divulging the number and nature of consumer  complaints  they have received about a given company.
However,  the use of an 'ombudsman' to help resolve  conflicts  between  policyhclders  and companies  has
not yet developed in the United States.
The other element  of consumer  protection  relates to regulation  of the insurance  companies,  with
emphasis on their financial condition.  Use of standa~, mortality tables, requirements  for adequate
reserves, restraints on investment  practices, valuation  and nonforfeiture  laws, review of policy forms,
submission  of financial statements,  periodic financial  examinations  and a myriad  of related  measures  are
all designed  to maintain  the solvency  and claims-paying  ability  of the insurer. Where such measures  have
failed, and insolvency  occurs, state guaranty  funds have  been established  to satisfy policy  claims if assets
are insufficient.
31Beyond these  safeguards,  the policyholder  may have  recourse  to the courts for the redress of any
grievances  relating  to insurance. Such  matters fall under general laws since  judicial review  is outside  the
province of state Insurance  departments.
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a.  Operating Expense  Ratios
In describing  the operating  systems,  expenses  and financial  results of the companies  that constitute
the life insurance  industry in the United  States,  it must be recognized  that there are wide variations  among
individual  firms--large  and small, stock and mutual, old and new firms.  Nevertheless,  rough guidelines
to operating  ratios of various kinds are provided  by annual  tabulations  of industry operating  data.
All-industry  data tabulated by the ACLI for the year 1989 show insurance company income
dollars as arising 69.7 percent from premiums and annuity considerations,  while the remaining 30.3
percent was from net investment  earnings  and other income. On the outgo side, benefit payments  were
53.1 percent, additions  to policy reserve funds were 30 percent, and additions  to special reserves and
surplus funds were  1.7 percent of the  insurance dollar.  Operating expenses were divided into
commissions  to agents  for 4.7 percent of the total, with another  7 percent going to home office and field
office expenses. Finally, taxes were 2 percent of the insurance  dollar, while dividends  to shareholders
of stock companies were 1.5 percent of the industry total.  (For stock companies  alone, shareholder
dividends  were 2.4 percent of their insurance  dollars.)
As noted, these shares vary widely  by line of business; thus, investment  earnings  accounted  for
29.4 cents of each life insurance  dollar but were 47.6 percent of each annuity income dollar, according
to a special study by ACLI for the year 1983. On the outgo side, the life insurance  line added 20.6
percent of its dollar income  to reserves, while  the annuity  line  set aside  63.3 percent for reserves in 1983.
Operating  expenses, which made up 11.7 percent of company  outgo in 1989, are further broken
down in another ACLI tabulation  which shows commissions  as 41.5 percent of the expense  total, with
22.6 percent going to salaries and wages and 4.3 percent for contributions  to employee  benefit plans.
Advertising  expenses were 1.4 percent, real estate costs made up 4.4 percent and all other operating
expenses accounted for 25.8 percent of the total. Investment  operations required 11 percent of total
operating expenses, while insurance  operations  accounted  for the remaining  89 percent.
All of the foregoing  expense  shares have remained  fairly stable in recent years. However,  there
were wide differences between the exp^,nse  ratios reported by stock and mutual companies, evidently
because of differing methods of conducting business and the lines of business in which they were
engaged. For example, mutual companies  paid 29 percent of their operating expenses in salaries and
wages, while  stock companies  paid 19 percent. Conversely,  mutual companies  paid a lower share of total
expenses in commissions  at 26 per.ent, compared  with 51 percent paid by stock companies  out of their
expense  dollars. Also, investment  operations  accounted  for 19 percent of the expense  dollars of mutual
companies,  while stock companies  paid a much lower 6 percent of total expenses on investments.
b.  Profitability Measures
Because  of the unique accounting  system used by life insurance  companies, profitability  of the
industry has always been difficult to  measure or  to  compare with other financial institutions or
corporations.  For insurers, profitability is affected by a host of factors including actual mortality
experience,  investment  earnings, capital  gains or losses, the scale of policyholder  dividends, and federal
and state taxes.
33One crude measure  that may be used to measure  trends in profitability  is the ratio of capital  a.d
surplus  to total assets; if this ratio declines  over time, profitability  must be on the decline and vice-versa.
From 8.4 percent in 19;0, the capital-asset  ratio for the industry  slid to 7.2 percent in 1980  and declined
further to 6.4 percent in 1990.  But this ratio does not tell the full story, since it fails to include the
MSVR--the  special reserve standing  behind  both bonds and stocks, adding  20 percent or more to the size
of the capital base.  Under the MSVR system, capital gains from the common stock portfolio are
channeled first into the MSVR and then into the surplus account only after reaching a prescribed
maximum; losses are charged against this reserve in order to cushion surplus against market price
fluctuations. Gains and losses  on bondholdings  are also channeled  into the MSVR  according  to formulae
set up under NAIC rules. Adding  the MSVR  to capital  and surplus,  the total capital ratio for the industry
has been virtually  unchanged  for the past decade, standing  at 8 percent of assets in 1989, followed  by a
slight decline  to 7.6 percent in 1990.
It must be noted, however, that capital-asset  ratios  deviate widely around this industry average.
According  to a special study by an ACLI task force on solvency  problems, large insurance  companies
with assets over $5 billion showed  average capital-asset  ratios of 5.3 percent, in sharp contrast to small
companies with assets under $100 million where average ratios were 20 percent.  Yet, the larger
companies  are often viewed  as the stronger, financially  sound companies  while smaller companies  have
had a much worse  record for insolvencies  in recent years. Evidently,  capital ratios are only one of many
indicators  of financial  strength and profitability  trends.
While there are no widely  accepted  measures  of profits in the life insurance  field, certain crude
approximations  are possible, using industry data compiled  from annual statements.  The base for such
measures  is capital and surplus, plus the security reserves of the MSVR at the beginning of each year.
Industry earnings may then be  defined as  "net gains from operations" from which dividends to
policyholders  must be subtracted since they are a normal part of insurance  practice. However, capital
gains or losses  on investment  funds should also be factored in, since they reflect financial  results of the
companies  in a given year.
If the definition  of industry  earnings  is taken to include  only realized  capital gains (or losses),  the
profit ratios work out as shown in column A.  If r:nrealized  capital gains (or losses) are included in
industry earnings, the results appear in column B, as follows:
Column  A  Column  B
1985  25.1%  36.0%
1986  32.1  27.8
1987  16.3  2.0
1988  15.8  20.2
1989  22.4  31.7
1990  16.5  4.1
These rough calculations  illustrate  the variability  of industry  earnings, regardless  of the method
used, and call into question  the usefulness  of such measures  as a bepchmark  for comparisons.  Using data
that include only realized capital gains and losses is probably the better of the two measures, but
substantial  unrealized  losses cannot be totally ignored  since they carry implications  for later operating
results.
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mortgages  are not "m,'rked  to market", i.e., they are carried close to acquisition  cost unless  they go into
default. If market interest  rates rise sharply in a given  year, the market value  of fixed-rate  bond holdings
obviously  goes down, but this is not normally reflected  in statement  values or recorded as an unrealized
capital loss for the year.  Conversely,  declines in market interest rates would raise the liquidation  value
of bondholdings,  but this is not recorded  as a capital  gain. In short, the use of stabilized  values  for bonds
and mortgages which make up the bulk of industry assets makes it difficult to know the true state of
company  assets, surplus, or profits in a given year. The rationale  for maintaining  stabilized  asset values
is that an industry with long-term financial  liabilities  and assets should not be subject  to the vagaries of
short-term  or interim fluctuations  in market prices (except for its holdings of common stock which are
carried at market values).
c.  Taxation
Federal income  taxes levied on life insurance  companies  are based on a separate statute  designed
to take account of the special features of the business, differing from the normal taxes on corporate
profits. Over the years, there have been a number  of revisions  in life insurance  tax methods,  embodying
a variety of complex approaches.  The present law, enacted in  1984, is fairly similar to  standard
corporate income  taxation of net income after expenses, but with two major exceptions. The first is a
deduction  for dividends  paid to policyholders,  viewing  such payments  as a normal and necessary  part of
insurance  practices which adjust the net premiums  paid for insurance  coverage.  The second exception
is a special 20 percent deduction from gross income (net gains from operations) in order to keep life
insurance companies competitive  with other financial institutions.  In 1990, a further revision in the
federal tax law for life insurance raised the tax burden by substantial amounts, by disallowing the
previous  deduction  for "deferred  acquisition  costs", primarily  consisting  of company  commitments  to pay
commissions  on policy renewals in later years. Such costs previously had been carried as a current
expense  and a current tax deduction.
At the state level, life insurers are required to pay a flat-rate  tax, normally 2 percent, on the gross
premiums  received  from residents  within  the state.  Premium  taxes are levied on out-of-state  companies
to the extent that they collect premiums  from residents  of the state.  To prevent state legislatures  from
charging higher premium taxes on out-of-state  companies, in order to favor their domestic companies,
a defensive  form of reciprocal tax rates has developed. Under this system, if State A charges higher
premium taxes on a company  domiciled  in State B, the law in State B provides that companies  based in
State A will likewise be charged a higher tax on the premiums collected from State B. This form of
reciprocity  has kept state premium taxes fairly uniform at the 2 percent level.
Beyond these two forms of taxes, life insurers pay normal business  taxes for social security  for
its employees, property taxes on real estate it owns and uses for company purposes, sales taxes on
furniture and supplies it purchases, and state income  taxes levied in several states on business  profits.
35VIl.  PUBLlc  POLICY ISSUES
A number  of persistent  policy  issues  of public  concern  have received  repeated  consideration,  both
inside and outside the life insurance industry, during the past several years.  This section will describe
these issues in terms of the pros and cons that have been raised, but without  taking sides or attempting
to resolve these controversies. It is believed, however, that each of these issues deserves the close
attention  of policymakers  concerned  with the equitable  and proper conduct  of insurance  operations.
a.  Taxation of the Inside Buildup
A recurring policy question raised by tax specialists has been the exemption  from tax of the
interest earnings  on accumulated  assets arising  from cash-value  life insurance,  i.e., the "inside  buildup"
on whole life products. Such earnings  are currently  untaxed  under federal income tax laws, as explained
in Section  IlI-b above.
The primary argument for taxing the inside buildup rests on the premise that cash- value life
insurance  has a savings element  which should  be treated the saiae as any other form of personal saving.
Interest earned on corporate bonds, money market funds, bank certificates of deposits and the like is
subject  to current income  taxation;  hence, it is argued, life insurance  should  be taxed the same as a matter
of tax equity. Of equal importance  to proponents  of such , ration is the fact that taxing  the inside  buildup
woulfl add many billions of dollars in needed federal tax revenues each year.  The U.S. Tfreasury
department  propcsed such taxation  as part of general tax reform measures in the early 1970s  and again
in the mid- 1980s,  but the t .oposals were not adopted  by the U.S. Cor.gress  on either occasion.
Life insurers protested that the inside buildup was a necessary  and integral part of providing
permanent insurance protection, arising from the level-premium  method of payment for whole-life
insurance. The industry argued  that it would  be unfair and unworkable  to levy taxes on a form of asset
increase which had not yet been "constructively  received"  by the policyholder; it would be like taxing
the increase in the value of a family's home each year, even before the home  was sold. Moreover, such
taxation would fall most heavily on older taxpayers whose policies had built up a sizeable cash value
through the years, with sizeable interest credits occurring in later years.  The companies posed the
problem  that older people might cash in their policies  to avoid a new tax, leaving them without coverage
when it was most needed.  It was further urged that future sales of level-premium  cash-value life
insurance  would fall off drastically if this new tax were adopted, leaving large numbers of widows and
children with little or no coverage and possibly dependent  on public support in the absence of private
resources. In any case, it was argued  that life insurance  policies  are basically  different  from market-place
investments  such as bonds and stocks and should  not be taxed in the same way.
b.  Life Insurer Solvency
Because  of the rising tide of company  insolvencies,  including  a number  of larger firms in recent
months, the issue of so'vency has taken on new prominence  for the public, the regulators, state and
federal legislators, and the industry itself.  The basic concern of all parties is to preserve the ability of
insurers to meet the claims of their policyholders.
In order tc protect i Xe  consumer  public, the most fiundamental  mission of insurance regulators
is to maintain  the solvency  of the companies  within  their jurisdiction. This function  is carried  out through
a variety of statutory requirements and supervisory activities, including restrictive investment  !aws,
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examination  of company books, etc.  as described in preceding sections  of this paper.  In retrospect,
flaws in this regulatory system have been exposed in the past few years, evidenced  by the number and
size of insurance  companies  that have required regulatory  intervention.
For policyholders,  the solvency  issue revolves  around the question  of full and timely  payment  of
claims for death benefits, annuities,  and pensions  on wlhich  they have relied.  For the industry at large,
public alarm that insurance insolvencies  might spread could persuade policyholders  to withdraw their
funds from otherwise  sound companies,  forcing liquidation  of assets at a loss, endangering  their capital
base, and bringing  on insolvency  that was not otherwise  in prospect. For regulators,  the insolvency  issue
suggests that they have not adequately  performed their basic supervisory function and that they need
tighter standards  or broader powers, For all parties, there appears to be general agreement  that reforms
are needed.
Working through the NAIC, state insurance regulators have developed a solvency agenda of
actions designed to tighten their policing of companies, including minimum standards for insurance
department resources, improved evaluation  of reinsurance practices, more effective examinations  of
companies, bigger budgets for solvency analysis by NAIC, and development of risk-based capital
requirements. In addition, the regulators  are working toward special reserves against mortgage loans,
similar to the mandatory  reserve for securities. Broadly  stated, state regulators  have been bending  every
effort toward strengthening their supervisory resources and powers, in order  to head off further
insolvencies  which will discredit their performance  as regulators.
Within the life insurance  industry, acting through the ACLI, a spe,ial Task Force on Solvency
Concerns was established  in September 1989  to analyze  the causes for the upsurge in insolvencies  and
recommend  policy changes to the ACLI Board.  One year later, after careful study of solvency  issues,
the Task Force recommended  a series of steps  designed  to tighten state regulation  in the investment  area,
to improve  sol'r.'ency  oversight  methods,  and  *- strengthen  the funding  of insurance  department  operations.
Subsequent  policy positions of the ACLI have supported specific means to carry forward these broad
recommendations.
The U.S.  Congress has been alert to the financial problems of the life insurance industry,
cognizant  of the recent widespread  failures among  savings and loan associations  and in the commercial
banking field.  Proposals have been made for a new federal role in the regulation of life insurers,
providing  for such solutions as federal minimum  standards  for state regulators to follow, with the threat
of federal takeover of regulation if states fail to comply (see below).
As noted earlier, the rash of insolvencies  among  smaller companies  has been traced to a variety
of causes, ranging from fraud and mismanagement,  to underpricing of products, to poor investment
performance.  The highly publicized insolvencies in  1991, however, appear to  stem directly from
investment  problems, particularly with excess concentration  on high-yield, low-grade corporate bonds
which have fallen sharply in market price.  A wider range of large companies have become suspect
because of heavy holdings of mortgage  loans on commercial  real estate which have become delinquent
or gone into foreclose  because  of overbuilding  and high vacancy  rates.  In the last analysis,  however,  the
ultimate responsibility for insolvencies  in the life insurance industry appears to rest with inadequate
supervision  by the state regulatory  authorities,  and a great many  steps are now being  taken to correct this
situation.
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As previously  noted, regulatory  authority over the insurance  industry was reserved  to the states
in 1945 with the passage of Public Law 15, known as the McCarran- Ferguson  Act.  Since that time,
however, they have been many proposals  to impose  federal regulation  to supplement  or supplant state
supervision  of insurance,  either because  state regulation  is too cumbersom_  or deficient  in protecting  the
public interest.
Those who favor federal regulation  argue  that continuing  lack of uniformity  among  the insurance
laws of  51  separate jurisdictions results in unnecessary and unwelcome complexities in  company
operations.  Filing annual statements in each of the states in which it operates is both costly and
inefficient  for a company  operating  over wide areas  or nationwide. Also, when a company  designs a new
insurance  product it must submit  such policy forms for approval by each of the several states in which
it plans to offer the product, requiring  much duplicative  expense  and delay.
Since most insurance commissioners  are political appointees, they are sometimes viewed as
unqualified  to  oversee the complex business of  insurance.  Moreover, many of the state insurance
departments  are felt to be understaffed  because of budget constraiats and therefore unable to regulate
properly. Critics outside  the industry  have charged  that state regulators  are subject  to undue influence  on
the part of local insurance  companies;  they argue that an arms-length  relation with a federal regulator
would be  more even-handed and therefore preferable. While most life  companies oppose federal
regu6 ion of insurance,  a number  of the larger life companies  operating  on a national  scale favor federal
regulation  as a more efficient  and logical  form of both chartering  and supervision  of company  operations.
In the early 1970s,  a number  of life companies  actively  supported  new Congressional  legislation  providing
for optional federal chartering  of life companies, but the proposal was not widely favored within the
industry and it failed of passage.
The arguments favoring  state regulation  start with the concern that a single regulatory body at
the federal lev'l  might prove to be unsympathetic  to local conditions, slow to respond to changes,
inflexible  in rul6anaking,  and high-handed  in its decisions.  On the positive side, it is argued that the
NAIC has brought a high degree of uniformity among state insurance codes through a long series of
Model Acts adopted over the years.  Local problems can be handled on the local level with state
regulators. An unwise  state insurance  law or regulation  may have a local impact  but a nationwide  effect
is avoided. Those who defend state regulation  may admit to its defects, but they argue that the remedy
is to strengthen  and support the present system rather than to turn to an unknown  and untested  system
of federal regulation.
A new phase in the controversy  over federal vs.  state regulation  opened in mid-1991  after the
much-publicized  insolvencies  of several large companies. Congressional  proposals  were made to set up
a federal insurance  authority  which  would  establish  detailed  regulatory  standards  for insurance  operations.
If a state regulatory authority  satisfied  the minimum  federal standards  it would be accredited  to supervise
companies  in its jurisdiction; if the federal regulatory  standards were not met, companies  domiciled in
that jurisdiction would lose their license to conduct interstate business unless and until they were
re-domiciied in an accredited state.  The federal authority would also have power to bypass the state
regulator and suspend the license of an individual  company  directly, whenever  necessary  to protect the
public. The future of such proposals  is uncertain.
38d.  Guarantee  Funds and Moral Hazard Issues
The state guarantee  associations  which have been established  in all but one jurisdiction  since the
early 1970s are designed  to assure payment  of policyholder  claims, up to specified dollar limits, in the
event of impairment  of surplus or insolvency  of an insurance company. One concern that slowed the
passage of such enabling legislation  was the question  of moral hazard, that is, the fear that the presence
of such guarantees  would open  the door to unsafe  practices  or unfair  pricing  by rival firms, leaving  others
to make good on insurance  claims if insolvency  resulted.
In practice, the backup  of guarantee  funds for life insurance  policies is roughly similar to federal
deposit insurance for banks and savings and loan associations. In order to bring in new business  by
offering  higher interest rates on investment-oriented  products, companies  may be implicitly  encouraged
to assume  higher investment  risks if there is a guarantee  fund present to "pick  up the pieces" in the event
of later collapse through insolvency. Thus, the presence of a guarantee  fund may tend to bring on the
situation  it is intended  to correct, some analysts  assert. Of course, much  the same may be said of federal
deposit insurance,  established  in the 1930s  to enhance  public confidence  in commercial  banks and savings
and loan associations.  In fact, many observers today contend that a  contributing  factor in recent
widespread  failures of savings  and loans  has beeni  the willingness  of depositors  to place money  with shaky
institutions to obtain higher savings rates, confident that federal deposit insurance would cover any
shortcomings  in the institution's  investment  performance.
While the moral hazard issue is difficult  to deny, the larger advantages  of state guarantee  funds,
as with federal deposit insurance, have convinced  most affected  parties of their necessity. In the life
insurance industry,  financially sound companies can be  expesed to  policyholder withdrawals of
considerable  magnitude, if there is a loss of public confidence arising from insolvencies  of other life
companies,  or even a more general concern  about the financial stability  of the industry.  It is for this
reason that companies have been willing to  support guarantee fund arrangements, and to  pay the
assessments  that they may require, as a necessary  price for maintaining  the good name of life insurance
in the public mind.
e.  Investment  Re2ulation  and Safety
An inevitabie  conflict between risks and returns is ever present in investment  practices of the
insurance  industry.  On behalf of the consumer  public, state regulators  insist on a high degree of safety
of invested  funds, expressed  largely through requirements  for diversification  of assets and for minimum
standards  of asset quality.  By contrast, investment  departments  of life companies  are inclined  toward
maximizing  investment  returns, within  the bounds  of reasonable  safety of principal, in order to produce
investment  yields  that will attract customers  to their products  and/or increase  company  profitability. The
problem is to arrive at an appropriate  balance  between  these conflicting  objectives.
Over the years, investment  restrictions  imposed  by state regulators  have been very conservative,
often based on a list of permitted investment  forms along  with specific quality  standards and backed by
limits on asset percentages  allowed in the various investment  categories. To provide for a degree of
flexibility, the state laws in the late 1950s  adopted 'leeway clauses"  by which companies  could  invest  up
to 2 percent of assets in forms not otherwise  specified.  Later, the leeway clauses were liberalized  in
stages to allow as much as 10 percent in any form the company  desired. Such leeway  was used not only
for innovative  investment  instruments,  but also to cover that portion of mortgage loans that exceeded  the
limit of 75 percent loan-to-value  ratios and to stretch other investment  standards in similar ways.
39A radical change in investment regulation in New York State occurred in  1983, with the
abandonment  of qualitative restrictions on investments, i.e.,  those dealing with credit standards and
quality requirements. These were replaced with a looser "prudent individual"  rule along the lines that
had prevailed  for many years in the State of Wisconsin  with good results.  However, interpretations  of
what investments  are "prudent"  in the business  sense  can be the source  of much  disagreement,  particularly
when  state regulators  are expected  to monitor  and enforce investment  laws in their periodic  examinations.
In view of the recent insolvencies  of companies  that invested  heavily in high-risk "junk bonds",
there have  been serious  concerns  about  the failure of regulators  and the companies  alike to observe proper
safety standards in their investment operations.  In reaching for high yields to  fund the populau
investment-oriented  products, life insurance companies  have also invested heavily in commercial  real
estate mortgages  which  have since  encountered  record  delinquencies  because  of the overbuilding  of office
space in 1989-90, followed  by the economic  recession  of 1990-91  which produced  high vacancy rates
nationwide. 7he problems  with commercial  real estate have been shared by other institutional  lenders,
however, particularly the commercial  banks and savings and loans.  In view of the general economic
conditions  which have led to the recent poor performance  of commercial  mortgages, it is not clear that
such loans were inherently "unsafe" or that state regulators should share the blame for the recent
difficulties resulting for life companies. Still, it is likely that a  more watchful attitude among the
regulators will prevail in future years.
f.  Accountine Standards for Asset Valuation
*  Life insurance  companies  are required to carry common  stocks at market value in their annual
statements. Bonds  that have gone into default must also be carried at market, and those securities that
appear to approaching  default are marked down from their previous statement  values. However, those
bonds and mortgages  that are meeting  their interest  and principal  repayments  on schedule  are considered
"in good standing" and are carried in financial statements  at "amortized  value", i.e., at or near their
original purchase  price.
The implications  of this system  of asset valuation  becomes clearer when it r.-Aized  that a rise in
market interest rates on corporate and government  bonds means a corollary decline in the market price
of outstanding  issues.  But such declines  are not registered in the financial  statements  of life insurance
companies  if the bonds are in good standing. Such treatment  differs radically  from such investments  as
mutual bond funds which are "marked  to market" monthly if not daily.
The rationale  behind  using  stabilized  values  for life company  bond  portfolios  stems primarily  from
the traditional practice of holding bonds to  maturity, rather than trading bonds frequently at short
intervals.  If a bond is not to be sold before it matures, why should the interim fluctuations  in market
yields  and prices be allowed  to change  the statement  value on the company's  books, it is argued. More
broadly, if the life insurance company  is viewed  as an ongoing concern  with a long time horizon, there
is no reason to record its assets at liquidation  values  as if it is expected  to go out of business  tomorrow.
Another practical reason for stabilized  values is the fact that a large share of life company  bond
portfolios  consist of single-owner  private placements  in large denominations  for which no ready market
value exists; current resale price can be only roughly estimated. Similarly,  commercial  mortgage  loans
do not carry a market price that can be recorded with accuracy; thus, original  value is normally used for
statement  value.
40To underpin this system of stabilized values for most bonds, state regulators in the  1940s
established  the Mandatory  Securities Valuation  Reserve  (described  earlier).  In the event that a bond is
sold at a loss before maturity, or goes into default with a consequent  mark-down  in value, such losses
are charged against the MSVR.  In this way, company surplus is not affected until the Reserve is
exhausted. As explained  earlier, bonds with a lower credit rating must contribute  more heavily to the
MSVR  each year than the higher-grade  bonds  that are in good standing.
There is no special  reserve against  mortgage loans in life company  portfolios at present. In past
years, mortgage  loans have not produced  notable  losses;  those losses  that did occur were charged against
surplus.  More recently, after mounting  defaults on commercial  mortgages,  there have been proposals
for expanding  the reserve system  to provide  for mortgage  losses as well as bonds  and stocks.
Over the years, there have  been  frequent  criticisms  of the current system  of stabilized  values,  both
from the accounting  profession  and from state regulators  themselves. The argument for current market
values on all investment  assets is based on the concept  of "full  disclosure"  and the public's right to know
the true condition  of the institution,  so that they can evaluate  the safety of the funds they have entrusted
to it.  But a counter argument is made that the public should not be given a false cause for alarm by
recording  declines in market values that have not translated  into realized losses; such false alarms could
produce destabilizing withdrawals without due  cause, to  the  detriment of  both  companies and
policyholders.
The most persaasive argument against marking all assets to market, however, is the logical
corollary of marking all liabilities  to market.  In simple terms, if interest rates rise and overall asset
values decline in market terms by, say, 10 percent, should the policyholder  be informed  that the dollar
value of his insurance  coverage  has likewise  been reduced  that year by some percentage? Few insurance
regulators  would be willing  to accept a system with that form of disruptive  and misleading  information.
g.  Linkages between Banks and Insurance Companies
In the main, linkages  between commercial  banks and insurance companies  are prohibited  in the
United  States.  There are, however, exceptions  to this basic  rule. National  banks are permitted  to sell and
underwrite credit life insurance, related to consumer loans and mortgage loans.  They also may sell
insurance in towns with a population  of 5,000 or less or in any location deemed to have inadequate
insurance  agency  facilities.  State-chartered  banks in 13 states  may sell  (but may  not underwrite)  insurance
unless they arv part of a bank holding  company  system, for which federal law prohibits  such activities.
As a result of these restrictions, actual sales of life insurance  by commercial  banks has been minimal,
limited mainly to bank sales of credit insurance.
During the past 10 years, a number  of federal and state legislative  proposals  have been offered,
with the intent  of breaking  down the long-standing  barriers between  banking  and insurance. At the state
level, permissive  legislation  has been enacted  in two states (South Dakota and Delaware) but adverse
rulings by the Federal  Reserve  have  prevented  actual  sales activities. In addition,  a number  of court  cases
have arisen over legal interpretations  of state and federal laws, but with no basic changes  resulting  in the
fundamental  rules. At the federal level, no new legislation  has been  enacted  in the banking-insurance  area
although  new proposals  are currently  pending in the U.S. Congress.
The legal separation  of banking and insurance  powers datws  back primarily  to the Banking  Act
of 1933, known  as the Glass-Steagall  Act, which limited  bank activities  in insurance  and also separated
41commercial  banking and corporate securities underwriting.  The reasons for separating banking and
insurance, and the arguments  for retaining  the barriers to such linkage include the following:
1.  Permitting  banks to conduct  insurance  operations, or insurance  companies  to conduct a
banking business, could produce  an unhealthy concentration  of economic  power  either
nationally  or at the local level.  Combining  financial  powers under a single ownership
could reduce competition in loan markets, particularly in localized markets for home
mortgages, farm mortgages  or business  loans.
2.  Commercial  banks would gain an unfair competitive  advantage  over insurance  company
agents, since they could draw upon irside information  regarding  a depositor's financial
status in drawing up prospect lists for insurance  sales.  Also, businesses  and consumers
seeking  bank loans could be subject to subtle pressures  to buy their insurance  from the
bank, in order to gain approval  of their loan application.
3.  Since bank deposits are federally  insured, and the public feels that their funds are safe,
they mav also favor purchase  of insurance  from a commercial  bank in the belief that the
federal backing also applies. Insurance  companies  would thus be left at a disadvantage
because of this likely confusion  in the public mind.
4.  Banks should not be allowed to engage in non-banking  activities such as insurance or
securities underwriting, since they could expose the bank to financial risks that could
jeopardize the safety and soundness  of the banking  system on which the public relies.
On the other side of the argument, those who favored  bank entry into  the insurance  field offered
the following  views:
1.  Competition  would be enhanced, and the public better served, if banks were allowed  to
offer insurance products to  the public. Some supporters suggested that the cost of
insurance  would be lowered  by such bank activities  because  of cost-saving  efficiencies.
2.  Commercial  banks have been losing market share in the financial markets, not only in
domestic  markets,  but also in relation  to foreign  banking  enterprises  such as the Japanese.
Permission  to enter the insurance  and securities  businesses  would enlarge the financial
size and scope of commercial  banks in the United States, and allow them to compete
more effectively  on a global  basis.
3.  Entry into insurance  and security  sales would enhance  bank profits and thereby improve
the financial  soundness  and capital  base of commercial  banking.
4.  These enlarged powers for commercial  banks would improve their diversification  and
thereby enhance  the financial  stability  of the commercial  banking  system.
5.  Allowing financial institutions  to conduct financial business of all kinds, without the
present compartmentalization,  would serve the public's need for "one-stop financial
services' and provide a "level playing field" among financial institutions  on a fair and
equal basis.
42While the majority  of life insurance  companies  are opposed  to bank entry into  the insurance  field,
a few companies  have supported such a change  on the condition  that life insurance  companies  would be
allowed  to owa commercial  banks. The reasons behind their position  include the following:
1.  Life companies  that owned a commercial  bank would be able to offer a wide range of
banking services to their policyholders, both individual  and corporate.  These include
federally insured bank accounts  and certificates  of deposits, plus bank credit cards, plus
various trust services to complement  the present lines of insurance.
2.  There are a number of operating synergies between banks and insurance companies,
including maintenance  of customer records, extending related services to established
customers, expertise in financial markets and lending procedures, etc.  Combining
banking and insuranc, operations could bring in new customers and better profits if
conducted  efficiently.
3.  More generally, some life insurance companies  in the 1980s came to believe that the
financial  services revolution  of that period would lead in time to the wholesale  removal
of legal barriers to affiliations of banks, insurance companies and securities firms.
Accordingly,  they sought to be in the fore-front  of such simultaneous  activities in order
to gain an early foothold, capture market share and thereby strengthen  their own profit
potential.
As a practical matter, legal barriers to the full-scale integration of banking, insurance and
securities firms have not been repealed to date.  Moreover, the appeal of reciprocal entry into such
financial  operations  has been sharply reduced  by the widespread  failure of banks, the financial  problems
of investment  bankers and securities  brokers, and the recent insolvencies  among  life insurance  companies.
Prospects  of greater profits through financial  integration  have faded, the pressures  for repeal of existing
barriers to reciprocal entry have diminished, and the corporate planning  for entry into related financial
fields no longer carries a high priority.
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45APPENDIX A
PERFORMANCE  RATIOS  OF IRIS
RATIO  1  CAPITAL AND SURPLUS CURRENT YEAR
- CAPITAL CHANGES PAID IN
- SURPLUS ADJUSTMENTS PAID IN
- CAPITAL AND SURPLUS PRIOR YEAR
DIVIDED BY
CAPITAL  AND SURPLUS PRIOR YEAR
RATIO 2  NET GAIN FROM OPERATIONS DIVIDED BY TOTAL  INCOME
RATIO 3  COMMISSION ON PREMIUMS AND ANNUITY CONSIDERATIONS
+  GENERAL INSURANCE EXPENSE
DIVIDED  BY
FIRST YEAR PREMIUMS COLLECTED
+  SINGLE PREMIUMS COLLECTED
+  RENEWAL PREMIUMS COLLECTED
+  ANNUITY AND OTHER FUNDS DEPOSITS
RATIO 4  NET INVESTMENT  INCOME
DIVIDED BY
TABULAR INTEREST  INVOLVING LIFE OR DISABILITY CONTINGENCIES
+  TABULAR  INTEREST ON ACCIDENT  AND HEALTH POLICY FUNDS
+  TOTAL INTEREST CREDITED ON DEPOSIT FUNDS AND OTHER LIABILITES  WITHOUT LIFE
OR DISABILITY CONTINGENCIES
RATIO 5  NON-ADMITTED  ASSETS DIVIDED BY ADMITTED ASSETS
RATIO 6  REAL ESTATE (ASSETS) DIVIDED BY CAPITAL AND SURPLUS
RATIO 7  INVESTMENTS IN AFFILIATES DIVIDED  BY CAPITAL AND SURPLUS
RATIO 8  COMMISSIONS AND EXPENSE ALLOWANCES ON REINSURANCE CEDRD
- COMMISSIONS AND EXPENSE ALLOWANCES ON REINSURANCE ASSUMED
DIVIDED BY
CAPITAL AND SURPLUS
RATIO 9  TOTAL PREMIUMS CURRENT YEAR
- TOTAL PREMIUMS PRIOR YEAR
DIVIDED BY
TOTAL PREMIUMS PRIOR YEAR
RATIO  10  CHANGE IN PRODUCT MIX
RATIO  11  CHANGE IN ASSET MIX
RATIO 12  CHANGE  IN RESERVING RATIO
46APP  MNDIX  B
LIFE INSURANCE  PROFITABILITY
(in billions of U.S. dollars)
Prior year data:  1985  1986  1987  t988  198  l990
Capital and surplus  $50  $57  $64  $67  $75  $84
MSVR  10  IQ  -1  15  16  18  19
Total C,S, MSVR  60  68  79  83  93  104
Current year results:
Net gains from operations"  10.4  8.8  6.3  10.1  14.2  17.3
Plus:  realized capital gains  4 7  13.0  6 6  30  6.7  -L1
Total  15.1  21.8  12.9  13.1  20.9  17.2
As percent of C,S, MSVR  25.1%  32.1%  16.3%  15.8%  22.4%  16.5%
Net gains from operations"  10.4  8.8  6.3  10.1  14.2  17.3
Plus: Total (net) capital gains  11 2  10.1  A4  3  . 15.3 -13.0
Total  21.6  18.9  2.0  16.8  29.5  4.3
As percent of C,S, MSVR  36.0%  27.8%  2.5%  20.2%  31.7%  4.1%
1/ After policyholder  dividends  and before federal taxes.Policy  Researc;  Working  Paper  Series
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